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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the role of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees,
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the Democratic Caucus in matters
pertaining to strategic nuclear weapons programs. Three strategic programs are used as
case studies to support this evaluation; the Trident submarine and missile, the B-l bomber,
and the MX missile. By comparing each committees' funding recommendations to that
approved by Congress as well as their success in blocking amendments which would affect
such recommendations, it is apparent that the respective Armed Services Committees
dominate in strategic nuclear issues. This was found to be true when strategic nuclear
programs were debated largely within the confines of the committees as well as when they
reached the congressional agenda. The MX missile, however, was a significant exception
as it resulted in a shift of power away from the House Armed Services Committee and to
the liberal arms control activists, via the forum of the Democratic Caucus. A detailed
analysis of the MX case provides much useful information for strategic planners
concerning the formulation of new strategic nuclear weapons programs, demonstrating the
potential pitfalls and proposing ways to avoid these pitfalls; and if they can not be avoided,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Vietnam war, Congress has played an increasingly active role in national
defense matters. This is particularly true in the area of strategic weapons programs. As
James Lindsay has observed, the deference Congress once gave to the executive branch in
matters concerning nuclear weapons has been replaced by a serious concern for policy
matters. 1 The purpose of this paper is to examine the post-Vietnam congressional decision-
making process to develop an understanding of who within Congress possesses power
when in matters concerning strategic nuclear weapons.
This study will first examine the typical distribution of power within Congress in
decisions on strategic weapons funding. Three strategic nuclear weapon programs will be
used as case studies in this analysis: the Trident submarine and missile program, the MX
missile, and the B-l bomber. The emphasis will be on the roles played by the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC), the House and Senate
Appropriation Committees (HAC and SAC), as well as the Democratic Caucus. Second,
this study will expand upon Lindsay's work, which hypothesized when a strategic nuclear
weapon program would reach what he calls the congressional agenda,2 by determining
what impact achievement of such a status has on the relative power distribution within
1 James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore. MD: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 124-126.
2Lindsay, 87. A program is considered to be on Congress's agenda only when, for
whatever reason, it encounters substantial opposition within the defense committees or
the parent chambers.
Congress. Third, given the normal power distribution within Congress and how this shifts
when a program is elevated to Congress's agenda, this study hopes to shed light on the fate
of future strategic nuclear weapon programs.
A. NATURE OF PROBLEM
Lindsay, Blechman, Lynn-Jones and others have greatly enhanced our understanding
of the congressional process as it relates to national defense matters, and have attempted to
transcend the popular notions of what drives congressional behavior. Lindsay, for
example, has argued that when an issue does reach the congressional agenda, it is interest
in policy rather than parochialism or deference that drives congressional behavior. 3
Furthermore, he has described those characteristics which will cause a nuclear weapon
program to reach the congressional agenda. According to Lindsay, "Weapon systems that
depart from declaratory doctrine or threaten to cross major thresholds in weapons
development generate significant congressional opposition."4 Furthermore, "the end of the
Cold War in 1989 added a new factor to agenda setting in Congress, namely acceptable
cost."5 He does not explain, however, what significance reaching that agenda has on
nuclear weapons programs, outside of creating congressional opposition.
3 Lindsay, 7. Interest in policy assumes members care about the substantive issues
surrounding weapons programs. By probing the merits of DoD requests, Congress has
substantial influence over nuclear weapons policy. Parochialism dictates that
congressional behavior is geared toward serving their constituents interests; thus
congressman will evaluate weapons systems in terms of how such programs affect the
local economic and social concerns of constituents. Deference is when members of
Congress defer to the executive branch on weapons acquisition issues. By declining to
question the substantive issues, Congress does not influence nuclear weapons policy.
4 Lindsay, 86.
5Lindsay, 104.
This study adds to Lindsay's work by showing who exerts greater influence within
Congress both when a strategic weapon program is debated within the committees as well
as when it reaches the congressional agenda. It shows how this influence is manifested in
program development and explains what this means for future strategic nuclear weapon
programs. This study will also reveal that Congress as a body still engages in deference
most of the time, even for strategic nuclear programs. However, this deference is no
longer to the executive branch; rather, it is to the powerful congressional defense
committees, particularly the armed services committees.
B . IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEM
Is it really important who possesses power within Congress? If past history is any
indication, the answer is an unequivocal yes. When a strategic weapon program has made
the congressional agenda, "outside" actors have demonstrated a serious interest in the
outcome of the debate. Primary among these "outside" actors are the liberal arms control
proponents, who have used the Democratic Caucus to swing the vote of the "congressional
moderates 6 ." The moderates, in turn, have been very successful at altering nuclear
weapons programs at the floor level, but have had little effect when such a program fails to
reach the congressional agenda.
6Lindsay, 1 7. As opposed to "doves" who normally oppose nuclear weapons and
prefer the strategic doctrine of minimum deterrence or "hawks" who normally support
new weapon systems and tend to favor the strategic doctrine of counterforce, "moderates"
lie in-between. They "see merit in both minimum deterrence and counterforce targeting
without being convinced that either doctrine is totally right; hence, they will support
some weapons systems and not others. Because moderates have flexible preferences,
they constitute the swing bloc that determines outcomes in Congress."
Their efforts have affected strategic programs by resulting in significant funding
reductions and/or by resulting in non-monetary restrictions. The anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) programs were altered significantly by such debates in the late 1960s and early
1970s, as was the MX program in the mid-1980s. In the case of the ABM programs, not
only were there significant funding cuts, but also severe restrictions on deployment. The
MX program likewise suffered large funding cuts and had numerous restrictions placed on
its basing options. Today, these debates appear to be affecting the SDI and B-2 programs
in an equally significant manner.
This will continue in importance over the next twenty years as the United States
debates crucial matters concerning strategic nuclear forces. Although significant progress
has been made in strategic arms control, nuclear weapons will still be important as a
deterrent force. The B-52 force is old and the B-lBs have limited penetrating capability.
With the future of the B-2 in question, it appears that a new strategic bomber will have to
be considered. Although relatively new, the first Tridents will be reaching their end of life
early in the next century, requiring development of a new SSBN by the turn of the century.
Finally, with the exception of the 50 MX (Peacekeeper) missiles, the entire ICBM force
will be over thirty years old early in the next century. Debates about a new ICBM and the
need for a triad of strategic nuclear forces will likely resurface.
C. METHODOLOGY
The subsequent chapters explore the nature of strategic weapon decision-making
within Congress since Vietnam. To determine who has power when within Congress, the
following methodology will be utilized.
First, relative influence within the House of Representatives will be determined by
discovering which committees most significantly shaped the final funding levels for
strategic programs over the past twenty years. The HASC budget recommendations versus
the House's action prior to the House-Senate authorization conference will be analyzed.
This same analysis will be employed between the HAC and the House prior to the
appropriation conference. Changes or a lack there of on the House floor concerning the
committees' recommendations will then be compared to the president's budget requests,
which will aid in determining the extent of committee influence.
Key amendments to the HASC and HAC recommendations also will be analyzed. In
this case, a low amendment passage rate would indicate that either the respective committee
was able to wield sufficient power to prevent its passage on the floor, or that the
amendment was of a trivial nature and was proposed solely to benefit its sponsors by
enabling them to publicly express their policy views. Thus, this chapter will necessarily
require non-quantitative analysis to determine which amendments were a legitimate measure
of House power.
Second, relative power within the Senate will be determined following the
methodology utilized for the House. Here, the players to be examined include the Senate's
two major defense committees, the SASC and the SAC, as well as the non-committee
members on the Senate floor.
The first two steps assume that nondefense committees have not played as significant a
role in strategic weapon programs. This assumption is supported by Lindsay who states:
"In the final analysis, Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, and other
congressional committees exercise very limited influence over congressional decisions on
nuclear weapons policy....No matter how much attention they attract, the nondefense
committees do not directly affect weapons development"7
Third, this methodology will build on the previous two chapters and attempt to
determine whether the House, the Senate, or one of its respective committees wields more
power. The conference reports to the Defense Authorization bill and Defense
Appropriation bill will serve as yardsticks in this analysis. The most contentious issues in
this year-to-year analysis, limited to the strategic programs researched in this study, will be
examined to see which house was more successful in getting its agenda adopted in the
conference report. Although monetary "deltas" will comprise a significant portion of this
analysis, it is important to realize that policy concerns may be of equal if not greater
importance in determining power. For example, one house may enter conference with a
knowingly impossible monetary recommendation for the primary purpose of attaining
bargaining power. Even if that house sacrificed more in negotiations percentage-wise, it
still may have gained more than it had planned. However, a seemingly less significant
policy issue (such as the decision to ban certain methods of deployment) may impart greater
far-reaching impacts than current monetary issues.
D. LIMITATIONS
Several methodological points need be made. First, much of the data analyzed does
not necessarily reflect true positions of the competitors. The problem of anticipatory
response 8 looms heavily here. For example, the HASC chairman may reduce a fiscal
7Lindsay, 41.
8Anticipatory response is the term used to describe the phenomena of altering a
recommendation so as to make it more readily acceptable, or initiating action so as to
lessen the possible consequences. The altering action takes place primarily in the
committees so as to make the recommendations less vulnerable to floor opposition,
where otherwise more drastic action could be taken. Initiation of action normally
involves one of the influential committee members proposing an amendment to its
earlier recommendations, hoping to prevent the adoption of more drastic measures
proposed by other congressional members. In either case, the committee
recommendation or initiation of an amendment does not reflect the true committee or
member's position, rather it is a preemptive act to avoid a more unfavorable
compromise.
recommendation to a point beyond his comfort. However, this action may be sufficient to
prevent a more drastic cut on the floor. Thus, a committee's proposal may already reflect a
compromise position. Likewise, a proposal could be made artificially high to strengthen a
bargaining position if debate appears inevitable; this strategy appears prevalent in the House
and Senate in their prior-to-conference actions.
A second methodological consideration is this study's separation of procurement from
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts. This separation was
executed primarily to show at what stage a nuclear weapon program becomes subject to
greater congressional attention. If, for example, the defining characteristics only raise
concerns in the procurement process, a restructuring of the authorization process may be
recommended, because it is wasteful to spend years in the RDT&E phase only to discover
that the program lacks political support for further development. On the other hand, if
concerns are raised in the RDT&E phase but the executive branch appears immune to such
concerns, then the Defense Department can learn from this analysis by understanding
which congressional signals are paramount in connection with strategic nuclear weapon
programs.
A third and particularly significant methodological consideration was the selection of a
criterion to measure relative power within Congress. This study elected to measure the
influence of various committees, institutions and members within Congress by comparing
their respective funding recommendations to the final funding levels. Other possible
measures were available, such as the number of hearings held, the number of hearing
pages, hearing content (e.g., nuclear doctrine versus monetary issues), or an evaluation of
the witnesses' positions, such as current Defense Department officials, retired officials, and
think tank members. However, if one believes that money speaks louder than words, then
the best measure for a program's support is the money appropriated to fund it. The other
possible measures would require a far more subjective evaluation since it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to separate rhetoric from meaningful debate and political
posturing from one's personal preference.
8
II. ISSUES IN THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER BALANCE
This chapter provides a brief overview of the legislative process related to defense
expenditures. Several issues are raised which are a prerequisite to understanding the
typical distribution of power within Congress and the dynamics which alter it. It describes
when the typical congressional power distribution is altered and who are the beneficiaries
of such a shift.
A . THE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS
The defense authorization process for a given fiscal year begins in January of the
preceding year with the submission of the president's budget. Through the winter, the
House and Senate conduct hearings on the proposed budget. In the meantime, staffs for
the various subcommittees prepare a document known as the "staff package." This
document recommends dollar amounts for each line item in the portion of the budget that
falls within the subcommittees' jurisdiction. The committees and subcommittees then take
action on the package, an alternative to the president's budget, in what is known as the
"mark-up." Before the "staff package" can be tabled for "mark-up," however, it must first
be approved by the subcommittee chairman, ensuring his influence on the contents.9
These "staff packages," as amended by the subcommittees, then become the basis for
the full committee "mark-up." Policy issues, as well as "pork" issues, are aired in the full
9Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 48.
committee. Traditionally, this forum is where the most controversial questions are resolved
in committee. 10 Once the defense bill meets with committee approval, it is forwarded to the
floor where it becomes subject to debate. This submission should occur early in the
spring, around April.
At this stage, the House and Senate floor members consider the Defense Authorization
bill and offer amendments under the most open "rules."11 After each house acts on the bill,
a special conference is convened to resolve differences. This conference is ideally held in
early summer, such that each house will have sufficient time to act on the authorization bill
prior to the appropriation bill.
In conference, many issues are resolved by staff while others, some of major
importance and some not, are resolved by conferees. Some of the major policy questions
are worked out in subpanels of the members. In this case, the chairmen continue to exhibit
a high degree of influence by appointing the heads to these subpanels. Excluding other
conferees from this process could perhaps strengthen the power of the few individuals
involved in the subpanels. This entire conference process is, incidentally, the most
secretive, and is often the most decisive phase of the congressional defense budgetary
process. 12
10Blechman, 49.
11 Blechman, 49. Traditionally, House members are more restricted than their
Senate counterparts in offering amendments to legislation by the "rule" that
accompanies each bill to the floor. The Defense Authorization bill is an exception,
however, as it is considered under the most open "rules" in the House.
12Blechman, 52.
10
As recently as 1961, the authorization process had garnered little significance. Then,
only two percent of the total defense budget required authorization. By 1971, this figure
had increased to 31 percent, and finally achieved 100 percent in 1983. 13 However, for the
cases under study in this paper, all of the programs fell under the purview of the
authorization committees. First, Congress decided in 1959 that all future procurement of
aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels shall require authorization. This provision would
cover the Trident submarine and missile procurement, as well as MX missile and B-l
bomber procurement. Second, Congress elected in 1963 to require authorization for all
research, development, testing, or evaluation carried on by the Department of Defense. 14
Following submission of the conference report, each house acts on the compromise
version of the Defense Authorization bill. After each house has passed the Defense
Authorization bill, it is ready for the President's signature. Traditionally, the bill is quickly
signed, since the compromise version worked out in conference includes substantial
negotiation with the White House to ensure the final version will not be subject to veto.
The same general steps apply for the appropriation process. Here, the House and
Senate Appropriation Subcommittees on Defense prepare the Defense Appropriation bill for
the full Appropriation Committee. Following the Committee's mark-up, it is submitted to
the floor of each House for action. The differences between the two passed versions are
13Blechman, Table 2-2, 31
14Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: New Procedures and Old
Realities", included in Toward a More Effective Defense , ed. Barry M. Blechman and
William J. Lynn (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), 133, Table
7-2.
11
then sent to appointed conferees where a compromise package is worked out. Upon
completion of the conference, the bill is resubmitted to the floor of each house where it is
again acted upon. Following approval, it is ready for the president's signature, or veto.
This process usually takes place much later in the year than the authorization process
with the Appropriation Committees normally submitting their reports to the floor in late
summer or early fall. Depending on delays, the committees may wait well into the next
fiscal year before submitting their reports. Once set in motion, however, the appropriations
process proceeds at a much faster pace compared to the authorization process. The House
and Senate frequently pass the submitted Appropriations bill following just a couple days
of debate, and rarely act on it more than a week or two following its submission. The
conference is then quickly convened to resolve the differences, with the compromise
version presented to each chamber for final approval, where it is again ready for
presidential action.
B. ISSUES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
House and Senate members present their views and exert influence at many stages of
the legislative process. There will obviously be many winners and losers in such a
democratic process, however. This paper analyzes three strategic nuclear programs, the B-
1 bomber, the MX missile and the Trident submarine and missile program, to answer four
major questions. First, who is normally most influential as measured by whose funding
recommendations are closest to the final amount authorized by Congress? Second, under
what circumstances do other players seem to dominate or heavily influence the final
congressional funding levels? Third, if and when such circumstances arise, who supplants
the normal power brokers and through what mechanism do they impart their influence?
Finally, what are the implications for future strategic nuclear weapons programs?
12
1 . Most Influential in Congress
By comparing the House and Senate Armed Services Committees' as well as the
House and Senate Appropriation Committees' funding recommendations for each program
to that requested by the president and to that finally approved by Congress, certain
conclusions can be reached concerning the normal balance of power in Congress, i.e.,
when Congress deals with programs that do not reach the congressional agenda. As
supported by analysis in chapters three and four, the Armed Services Committee of each
House tend to be the dominant actors. The Senate Armed Services Committee was
particularly dominant in the latter part of the 1980s, while the House counterpart tended to
dominate over the Senate in the 1983 to 1985 time frame. Rarely did the Appropriations
Committee of either house wield a significant amount of influence, especially as concerns
policy issues. In fact, the Appropriation Committees appeared most deferential to the
Authorizing Committees, tending to address budgetary concerns by cutting programs on
the margins instead of significantly altering the funding level of any program.
2 . When the Balance of Power Changes
The traditional actors involved in the authorization and appropriation process are
influenced strongly by "outside actors" when a program reaches the congressional agenda.
The Democratic Caucus of the HASC is the clearest example, shaping the MX program in
two significant ways. First, the Caucus deposed the HASC chairman in 1985 and did the
same in 1987 when it felt the partly line was not being pushed in conference. 15 Second,
15 Blechman, 38. In 1985, the caucus deposed Chairman Price of the Armed
Services Committee. When the caucus met in January 1987, Aspin was not
renamed as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He regained his
former office, but only after a pledge to follow the caucus's policy line.
13
the Caucus appointed special delegates to the House-Senate conference to ensure the liberal
views concerning arms control matters were represented. It even went so far as to allow
only its special delegates to participate in discussions involving arms control. 16
The normal process appears to change only when the most controversial of
matters arise. The debate, in these circumstances, leaves the confines of the committee
chambers and is fought on the floors. The Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debates of the late
1960s and early 1970s were the first modern example. Elements of some of the programs
examined in this study have also solicited this level of attention. The first to do so was the
B-l bomber in 1977 following Carter's cancellation of the program. The second involved
the controversial MX missile and basing throughout the mid-1980s. This apparent
deviation will undoubtedly continue into the future, evidenced by recent cases involving a
near cancellation of the B-2 and the ongoing face lift of SDL
Under what circumstances, specifically, does the normal process then change?
The all-encompassing answer is when a weapon program becomes a major public issue.
To reach this level, a weapon program has typically been comprised of similar
characteristics. From the ABM debates to the current B-2 and SDI debates, a general
characteristic is that the program is strategic in nature, either designed to deliver nuclear
weapons or defend against them; in either case, an element of nuclear deterrence.
Other congressional analysts have come to similar conclusions. Sean M. Lynn-
^Blechman, 39. None of the House-sponsored amendments survived the
conference in 1985. To avoid a similar problem in 1986, the House Speaker
appointed special conferees from outside the committee to observe their
support for arms control amendments in conference. In 1987, only the special
representatives from outside the committee were authorized to negotiate on
arms control amendments.
14
Jones, for example, believes that nuclear issues arise to the level of public debate for three
primary reasons. First, civilians and the military had equal experience fighting nuclear
war. Second, nuclear concepts such as deterrence and stability were relatively easy to
grasp and explain. Finally, nuclear issues generated public concern and thus broadened the
security policy debate. 17
However, not all nuclear weapon programs have received the attention that the
MX program generated, the Trident submarine platform being a case in point. Thus, it is
necessary to explore a further level to see what characteristics of a nuclear weapon system
engender such attention.
It is most apparent that a nuclear weapon program can solicit the public's attention
only when it is controversial in nature. The key to creating such controversy appears to be
whether or not the weapon program under consideration will lead to or accelerate an arms
race, thereby harming efforts at arms control, and relatedly, whether the public perceives an
increased likelihood for the possibility of nuclear conflict. Lindsay implies the latter as a
criteria for making the congressional agenda, but falls a step short. For example, he says,
"weapons systems that break with declaratory doctrine or open new chapters in arms
development appear, in the eyes of many legislators, to carry the potential for danger."18
Furthermore, in explaining why the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) reached the agenda,
Lindsay cited the critics who argued that "the MHV program opened the door to an arms
17 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Democratizing U. S. Defense Policy", prepared for
delivery at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 30 through September 2, 1990, 26-27.
18Lindsay, 104.
15
race in space."19 This study demonstrates that reaching the agenda will only significantly
affect program development if congressional members fear that a program will either start
an arms race or will hamper arms control negotiations.
The curtailing of the ABM systems by the early 1970s was effected largely by a
desire to prevent extension of the nuclear arms race, at least a perceived arms race, to the
ABM arena. The associated SALT I accords followed with a similar objective for offensive
nuclear arms. The effort today to curtail SDI also fits this general pattern.
The programs analyzed in this paper have also met with similar circumstances.
The nuclear freeze movement, prevalent in the early 1980s, is the best manifestation of an
increased fear of nuclear war. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
collapse of SALT II, tensions mounted between the superpowers and the nuclear freeze
movement, initiated in West Germany, traversed the Atlantic and became part of the
American public agenda. Arms control was placed at the top of the American agenda and
the MX program was utilized by the liberal arms control activists to achieve a softening in
Reagan's arms control stance.
3 . Who Becomes Important in "Agenda" Times
The short-term effect of the nuclear freeze movement was for President Reagan to
placate public fears and initiate START with his Eureka College address in the spring of
1982.20 The longer term effect was to empower the liberal arms control proponents in
Congress and to hold MX development hostage to progress in arms control. As this study
19Lindsay, 101.
20
"An Interview With Chief START Negotiator Edward L. Rowny," National
Defense, March 1983, 43.
16
will show, the three programs under analysis were not significantly affected by the normal
process prior to 1983. The MX program since fiscal 1983 is important, however, because
it showed that when a nuclear weapon program reaches the congressional agenda, the
liberal arms control proponents are empowered, and their means to controlling funding and
program development is via the Democratic Caucus and swaying of the congressional
moderates and House leadership to their side.
This liberal empowerment comes mostly at the expense of the normally
conservative HASC and SASC. The position of the HASC during this volatile time frame
was dovish relative to that of the SASC as concerns the MX program. The most apparent
reason is the empowerment of liberals through coopting of the moderates and House
leadership. When not subject to the intense scrutiny of the public, the moderates, who
dominate the House and the HASC, and best exemplified by the HASC chairman Les
Aspin, are quite hawkish. However, when subject to the scrutiny of the public and
pressured by the liberals, their swing to the left neutralized the power of the HASC and
ultimately the SASC via the conference. There are two plausible explanations why the
HASC is more vulnerable under such circumstances than its Senate counterpart. First, the
two year election cycle for House members make them more answerable to the public for
concerns of the day. Second, the Democratic Caucus appears to have greater influence in
the House.
4 . Implications for future weapon systems
If Lindsay's hypothesis is correct, it is likely that future strategic nuclear weapon
programs will also reach the congressional agenda. First, any future systems will likely
require a redirection of nuclear doctrine. The most apparent reason is the eagerness to
pursue follow-on negotiations to START that will likely leave the United States with a
fraction of its current nuclear arsenal. Important questions will have to be answered. For
17
example, will it be economically or strategically sound to maintain a triad of nuclear forces?
Is it desirable to eliminate the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MTRV) and only allow
one warhead per missile, or should submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) be
MIRVed to maintain some degree of cost effectiveness? Should nuclear armed sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-
N), be included in future strategic arms control negotiations? Other equally important
questions arise which possess a common element. They all indicate that current U. S.
nuclear policy is about to undergo fundamental change. Thus, the capabilities of new
strategic programs will heighten the difference between competing nuclear deterrent
ideologies. As the number of strategic nuclear arms are reduced, a counterforce strategy,
long supported by the hawks, may have to yield to a strategy based on countervalue, a
concept long endorsed by the more dovish members of Congress.21
Second, it is likely that any new nuclear program will employ significant
advanced technological capabilities. For example, it appears possible to nearly triple the
range of current cruise missiles. This would give the TLAM-N a range comparable to that
of a Trident C-4 missile, making it a strategic asset. Furthermore, such a missile could
incorporate advanced stealth technology and achieve an order of magnitude increase in
accuracy.22 Possessing such a stealthy, accurate, and long-range missile would cross a
21 Most experts believe that a minimum of 1500 to 2000 nuclear weapons are
required to maintain some sort of counterforce targeting capability. Proposed follow-on
talks to START II would reduce the numbers even below this minimum, requiring either
a significant departure in counterforce targeting, or relying on a countervalue approach.
^"Technology For National Security," Report by the Working Group on Technology,
submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, October, 1988, 104.
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threshold in weapons development by enabling numerous platforms to strike deep inland
targets effectively. The possible cancellation of the B-2 could result in development of a
new bomber that would represent a fundamental change compared to the technology
currently incorporated in the B-52 and B-1B force. Deployment of any version of the SDI
programs would similarly involve revolutionary change.
Finally, Lindsay's third condition of severe budget constraints appears to be a reality
for the foreseeable future. The near cancellation of the B-2 bomber in the fiscal 1992
budget is the clearest example. It appears that SDI derivative programs will also engender
significant congressional opposition in coming years. According to Representative Ronald
V. Dellums (D-CA), 1991 congressional action on the anti-missile plan crossed the line
from research to deployment, a very significant step that would soon spark a major anti-
missile debate.23 If it does reach the agenda, my thesis predicts that it will be subject to
significant funding cuts and that development of such a system will be linked to future arms
control, such as START II.
23The New York Times, November 18, 1991, A1
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III. POWER WITHIN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A. HASC VERSUS THE HOUSE
A review of the authorization and appropriation process in the House of
Representatives for the Trident, B-l and MX programs suggests that the Defense
Committees, particularly the House Armed Services Committee, have a dominant influence
on House action. Non-committee members were found to have paid a high degree of
deference to the committees recommendations, even when a program reached the
congressional agenda.
Lindsay concluded that once a program reaches the congressional agenda, it is policy
rather than deference which drives congressional behavior. The findings in this section,
however, suggest a more accurate statement may be that it is policy which drives committee
behavior, with non-committee members preferring deference. But, instead of deferring to
the White House, they defer to the committees. The MX case was found to be the only
exception, as the HASC was significantly limited in its influence. Thus, it will be
necessary to examine in detail what was so significant about the MX program that caused it
to alter the traditional relationship between the defense committees and the floor in a manner
the other programs failed to do.
1. Trident
The HASC recommendations concerning procurement for the Trident programs
were accepted by the House almost without change. Figure 1 illustrates this congruency.24
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Figure 1: Trident Procurement Authorizations
The lone exception, which occurred in 1983, fails to detract from the power of the
HASC concerning the Trident programs. In this case, an amendment was adopted that
slashed Trident procurement funds by $699 million. This action, however, was at the
request of the Defense Department and the HASC. In this case, the administration decided,
after budget submission, to equip the two requested Trident submarines with the costiier
Trident II (D-5) missile in lieu of the Trident I (C-4) missile. The proposed budget did not
provide sufficient funds for this change so the HASC recommended that the Trident
procurement request be reduced to one submarine to accommodate the belated
administration's decision. The Secretary of Defense indicated that this would be an
appropriate course of action and little opposition on the floor resulted
21
It should not be assumed, however, that this high degree of deference was a result
of the Trident program not being on the congressional agenda. First, there was a debate in
the early 1970s as to whether or not the submarine construction program should be
accelerated. Then, in the mid 1970s, there was much discussion concerning when or
whether development of the Trident II missile should commence. The Trident II missile
issue arose again in the late 1980s when the decision was made to deploy the missiles
despite on-going arms control talks. Finally, amendments were offered almost on an
annual basis that would have significantly altered the Trident programs.
In the period from 1970 through 1989, 14 amendments were proposed which
would have significantly affected the Trident programs.25 All but one of these were
rejected. The HASC recommendations concerning Trident R&D were similarly accepted
as illustrated by Figure 2, below.
25See Appendix B for a summary of House amendments to the Defense Authorization












71 72 73 74 75 76 7T 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Fiscal Year
Figure 2: Trident R&D Authorizations
On only one occasion did the House approve a funding level other than that
recommended by the HASC. In fiscal 1988, the HASC recommended that $1,098 billion
be authorized for Trident II missile R&D, but the House only authorized $1.0 billion. As
with the fiscal 1983 procurement case, this exception does not detract from the HASC
influence. The original R&D request was approved by the HASC on May 8. Before the
bill went to the House floor in early May, however, the panel had to draft an amendment
containing some $17 billion in additional reductions to meet the ceiling on defense
appropriations set by the House version of the budget resolution26 . Representative Aspin,
261987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 225.
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chairman of the HASC, offered a substitute which trimmed $98 million from the Trident II
R&D request, the amount the House authorized, and House attempts to defeat the Trident II
missile were once again decisively defeated, as indicated in Appendix B.
2. B-l
An analysis of the numerous B-l programs is equally decisive in demonstrating
the pervasive influence of the HASC. As shown below in Figure 3, not a dollar of the B-l
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Figure 3: B-1 Procurement Authorizations
27See Appendix C for B-1 Authorization fiscal data.
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Equally striking is the 100 percent concurrence in HASC recommendations and
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Figure 4: B-1 R&D Authorizations
As was true with the Trident program, one should not dismiss this amazing
degree of deference as a result of the B-l program not being a significant congressional
issue. It could be argued that the B-l bomber was the defense issue of the late 1970s,
certainly at the start of the Carter administration in which the President opted to cancel the
program. As shown in Appendix D, the amendment to continue production of the B-l
bomber, against the President's desire, passed by only a three vote margin. The latter part
of the 1980s also witnessed a strong degree of interest in the B-1B program as concerns
arose about the lack of ability of the B-1B to penetrate Soviet air defenses and significant
25
funds were requested to correct the numerous problems with the defensive avionics
p ckage. In each case, however, the House failed to alter the HASC recommendations,
usually by substantial margins.28
One could dismiss the above data as non-conclusive, however, by theorizing that
the House was just paying deference to the administration and not the HASC. Thus, it is
necessary to show that the HASC recommendations contained in the defense authorization
bill did, in fact, differ significantly from the budget requests. Figure 5, below, illustrates
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Figure 5: Trident Procurement Authorizations
28See Appendix D for summary of amendments to the Defense Authorization bill
pertaining to the B-1 program.
26
Figure 5 shows that in eight fiscal years, HASC recommendations differed from
the administration's request. In seven of these cases, the committee recommended
reductions (fiscal 1976, 1979, 1982, and 1984-87) while in fiscal 1977, the HASC
recommended a significant increase.
The R&D data is equally significant. There were eight fiscal years in which the
HASC recommendations differed (fiscal 1976 Transition, 1979 Supplemental, 1980-82,
and 1985-87). In all cases, these changes represented reductions from the administration's
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Figure 6: Trident R&D Authorizations
The B-l program, while not as indicative as the Trident program, still indicates
that the House was deferential to the HASC, and not the administration. The HASC altered
27
the administration's procurement request in a significant fashion on only one occasion.
This occurred in 1980 when the HASC recommended $200 million to start procurement of
a follow-on to the previously cancelled B-l bomber. The administration had made no
procurement request. The HASC did alter the B-l R&D requests five times, however.
This included elimination of the $105.5 million requested for fiscal 1979 and the $30.7
million requested for fiscal 1981, as well as significant reductions in fiscal 1985, 1987 and
1988.
3. MX
But the case of the MX missile program is indicative of a different sort of
relationship between the HASC and the House. A review of the procurement history for
MX programs, presented below in Figure 7, shows that the non-committee members
played an important part in shaping the House's funding recommendations.29





Figure 7: MX Procurement Authorizations
In each year, from fiscal 1984 through fiscal 1986, the House significantly
reduced the HASC's authorization recommendations for procurement. As shown earlier,
no such action occurred to either the Trident or B-l programs, even when these programs
reached the congressional agenda. This demonstrates that a fundamental shift in power
away from the HASC took place. Two important questions then need be answered. First,
why did the MX program solicit such extensive opposition? Second, who or what
supplanted the HASC as the power broker behind these procurement reductions?
29
The answer to the first question requires an understanding of the period just prior
to when the MX reached the agenda. Before Reagan's assumption of the presidency, the
House had strongly backed the MX program, as shown by the decisive defeats of
numerous amendments to reduce or eliminate the program.30 However, following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the SALT II treaty, the
administration started to take a hard stance on arms control. Tensions mounted between the
superpowers, and the nuclear freeze movement gained steam. Many liberal arms control
activists in the House became increasingly frustrated with Reagan's arms control initiatives
and saw the MX program as a way to achieve their objectives by holding future MX
development hostage to progress in arms control. Thus, the MX program reached the
congressional agenda under a different set of circumstances than did either the Trident or B-
1 programs.
The answer to the second question of who supplanted the HASC as the dominant
power concerning the MX program is slightly more complex. The most vocal opponents
of this program were the liberal arms control activists, but they were too few in number to
achieve the above results. The congressional moderates held the votes, but would need to
be pressured before they would defy the recommendations of the HASC. Something was
needed for the arms control activists to gain the votes of the moderates, and the Democratic
Caucus appears to have been their solution. MX procurement reductions illustrate how the
liberal arms control proponents used the Democratic Caucus to swing the votes of the
moderates and gain the support of the House leadership in opposition to the MX program.
30See Appendix F for summary of amendments to the Defense Authorization bill
pertaining to the MX program.
30
In 1983, a House measure to delete the entire $2.6 billion for procurement of the
initial 27 production-line models of the MX was defeated by only a 13 vote margin. But
two other amendments, both of significant substance, were passed. The first one,
sponsored by Representatives Price and Aspin, required future MX procurement and
deployment not to outrun the development of small, single-warhead missile, later dubbed
Midgetman or Small ICBM (SICBM). The second one reduced from 27 to 21 the number
ofMXs authorized for procurement, a reduction of $358 million.31
The Democratic Caucus first surfaced as a major factor in the MX debate in this
session. On June 14, 1983, a caucus of House Democrats expressed unhappiness that
senior members of the House leadership had voted on May 24 to approve flight tests for the
MX, giving the MX backers a 53 vote margin.32 Anti-MX Democrats exerted strong
pressure on House Speaker Tip O'Neill Jr., D-Mass. and he decided to defer action on the
MX section of the defense authorization bill until July. This action would give anti-MX
lobbying groups time to mobilize grass-roots MX opponents in hope of reversing the May
24 outcome.33 On July 20, production of the missile was approved by the House but only
with a 13 vote margin. Of the 20 switches, 19 were Democrats and a third of those were
relatively senior members who either held leadership posts or were widely believed to
aspire to them.34
31 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 181.
321983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 180.
331983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 201.
341983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 180.
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In 1984, ihc "centrists" in the House were able to save MX missile from its liberal
eritics for the fourth year in a row. Nonetheless, the MX program was severely limited.
The HASC had recommended a reduction in the number of MXs to be authorized from 40
to 30, but the House deemed this inadequate. The liberal arms controllers were successful
as they gained the support of Speaker O'Neill and the House I nocratic leadership. They
narrowly lost in the year's first MX vote on May 16 but won a symbolic victory on May
31. Here, they were able to defer the decision on fiscal 1985 MX production, involving
$1.5 billion, until early 1985.
The centrists, led by Chairman Aspin, succeeded by authorizing only 15 missiles,
and further restricted the program by preventing any money from being spent until April 1,
1985, and only then if the president stated that the Soviets were not indicating a willingness
to bargain in good faith on ICBM limits. This restrictive language was further strengthened
by another amendment that gave Congress, not the President, the last say on whether to
proceed with 15 missiles after April 1, 1985.35
1985 was the final year of the great MX debates, and once again the House
overrode the HASC recommendations. The HASC had recommended approval of the
missiles by a 37-8 vote. But the House adopted an amendment, offered by Representatives
Mavroules and McCurdy, which would prohibit additional production of MXs in fiscal
1986 and would impose a permanent limit of 40 on the number of MXs to be deployed.
The $921 million approved was for equipment to base previously authorized MXs in
existing missile silos and to keep the production line warm. This marked the first time in
35 1984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 35.
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nuclear history that a house of Congress acted to eliminate a strategic program requested by
the President.
Arms control activists influenced the debate. The official House leadership was
enlisted again under a steering committee chaired by Majority Whip Thomas S. Foley, D-
Wash., and Caucus chairman Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo. These two committees were
able to gather 20 members to lobby their Democratic colleagues to oppose the release of the
$1.5 billion.36 When Majority Whip Bill Alexander, D-Ark., announced that he would
oppose the missile, he became the last member of the Democratic leadership to feel the
pressure and fall in line on the MX issue.37
Although the House approved the HASC MX procurement recommendations after
fiscal 1986, the MX was still used extensively by liberal arms control proponents to gain
leverage in other arms control matters. In 1986, liberal arms control activists continued
their effort to ally themselves with Democratic and Republican centrists. They were
willing, however, to compromise on some of their highest priority goals. Since the liberals
had a strong hand in the Democratic Caucus, this gave some leading centrists a powerful
political incentive to deal with them. HASC chairman Aspin was particularly vulnerable
because he was under fire from liberals for supporting controversial aspects of the Reagan
administration's legislative agenda.
Having agreed on specific amendments to be pushed, the "liberal-centrist
coalition" utilized the Democratic leadership's control over the timetable and procedure for
361985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 123.
371985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 124.
33
floor debate to their maximum tactical advantage. They extended the debate on major arms
control amendments over several days. This allowed members who voted against Reagan
on those amendments to follow with "pro-Reagan" votes on others.38 However, the day
before Reagan met with Gorbachev in Iceland, House Democrats put off their legislative
efforts until 1987 to mandate certain arms control policies.39 Apparently, they were
unwilling to put themselves in a position of blame in case the arms control talks were a
failure.
The same efforts were revived in 1987 utilizing the Democratic leadership's
control over the order and timing of debate on the defense bill. This allowed members to
intertwine their anti-Reagan votes with pro-Reagan votes and thus placate conservative
constituents in their home districts. The organization and unity of the Democrats was the
decisive element behind the string of anti-Reagan votes taken May 5-6 by the House. Even
more important "was the cooperation across the spectrum of the Democratic Caucus in
support of the big amendments. Here, leading liberal arms control activists were joined by
Democratic moderates and conservatives from the HASC in arguing for the controversial
amendments."40
The rise in stature of the Democratic Caucus in 1983 coincided with when the
liberals became suspicious of Aspin, the Armed Services panel chairman since 1983. That
year, Aspin and other centrist Democrats narrowly saved the MX. Aspin's continued
381984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 454.
391984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 460.
401987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 233.
34
support for the MX, even after he had allegedly promised to drop it, was a factor in
dethroning him as Armed Services chairman in 1987. He was reinstated after promising to
consult with other leading Democrats before making deals with Reagan on controversial
issues.41
For MX R&D authorizations, the battle on the House floor was an order of
magnitude less heated, but significant fiscal differences did result on four occasions (fiscal
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Figure 8: MX R&D Authorizations




In the 1979 Supplemental request, the House denied $75 million that the HASC
had recommended for MX R&D for basing. The purpose of this action was to prevent the
Defense Department from pursuing work on an air basing method. In fiscal 1986, the
House again made a relatively minor monetary change with more significant policy
implications. In this case, a net increase of $50 million resulted when the House altered the
HASC recommendation by reducing the MX missile R&D request by $100 million while
boosting the SICBM recommendation by $150 million. This course of action was indeed
consistent with the liberals and centrists in the House, who saw the mobile, single-warhead
ICBM as a more stabilizing weapon than the MX. Finally, in fiscal 1989 and 1990, the
House adopted similar measures. In fiscal 1989, $300 million was added to the SICBM
recommendation while $292.9 million was deleted from the MX rail-garrison basing
account and $7. 1 million was deleted from MX missile R&D. In fiscal 1990, the MX rail-
garrison recommendation was again slashed, this time in half to $600 million, but at the
expense of the SICBM program, whose recommended funding of $100 million was
eliminated.
The liberal arms control activists thus expanded their use of the MX program.
First, they used it as leverage to gain concessions in Reagan's arms control stance.
Second, they used it as leverage to develop what they considered a more stabilizing
weapon, the single-warhead, mobile Small ICBM. House moderates were led by Aspin
and Representative Gore, D-Tenn., who supported deployment of MX only on condition
that it be linked to development of the SICBM.42
42 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 180, 190.
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4 . Summary of HASC versus the House
The above three cases do not fully support Lindsay's conclusion that it is policy
concerns vice deference which drives congressional behavior when a strategic nuclear
weapon program reaches the congressional agenda. This was true for the MX, but not for
the B-l and Trident programs. Apparently, Congressional actions are dictated by policy
concerns only when there is fear of accelerating the arms race or fear of damaging the arms
control environment. The above cases fully support this view, with "the potential for
danger" as the primary criterion for placing a program on the agenda.
Why then, did the Trident II missile system get through Congress relatively
unscathed when compared to the MX? First, unlike the MX, the Trident submarines were
perceived to be invulnerable to surprise attack. The MX missiles, however, were deemed
as susceptible to surprise attack following Reagan's decision to deploy them in fixed silos.
Furthermore, "many MX critics covered their political flanks by committing themselves
fervently to supporting the Trident II."43 As stated earlier, the liberal arms control activists
were too few in number to stop the strategic programs; they needed to swing the votes of
the moderates as well as some conservatives. This swing block could ill afford to
challenge both programs, however, since it would make them appear anti-defense to their
more conservative constituents back home.
B . HAC VERSUS THE HOUSE
Statistically, a similar deferential relationship exists between the HAC and the House.
Further analysis, however, reveals a different rationale for the high degree of deference by
non-committee members to the HAC.
431986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 481.
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1. Trident
In all but two years under study, the House appropriated to the dollar what the
HAC had recommended for the Trident submarine and Trident I and II missile programs.44
In 1976, the HAC recommended $888 million for fiscal 1977 Trident I missile
procurement, but the House only authorized $723 million for appropriation. For fiscal
1977 Trident I missile R&D, only $519.6 million was recommended but $569.9 million
was approved by the House.
The fiscal 1977 case fails to detract from the deferential relationship between the
HAC and the House. Representative Robinson (R-Va.) offered an amendment to cut the
procurement funding by $165 million, a reduction that had been recommended by Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld, together with a $50 million increase in Trident missile research
funds.45 The basis for this recommendation was that it would allow for improvements
without delaying the start of procurement, a remedy required due to a series of
malfunctions during the missile's test program.46
However, the amount the HAC recommended for the Trident programs varied
frequently from what the HASC had recommended and the House subsequently
authorized. The HAC recommendations for the various Trident programs also differed
frequently from the authorization levels in conference.
44See Appendix G for Trident Appropriation fiscal data.
45See Appendix H for summary of amendments to the Defense Appropriation bill
pertaining to the Trident program.
461976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 769.
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Why would the House approve, essentially without change, the HASC
recommendations, then approve the conference report, and then approve, again essentially
without change, the HAC recommendations, which varied frequently and in significant
amounts from the prior approvals? Was the House as an entity simply deferential to any
committee or conference report in matters relating to the Trident programs, or was there a
significant factor common to these numerous fluctuations?
In eight cases, the HAC recommended the conference authorized level as opposed
to the House authorized level. In another eight cases, the HAC recommendations varied
from the conference report on the authorization bill but concurred with the House
authorized level prior to conference. In over thirty cases, however, the HAC presented
numbers different from both the House and conference authorizations. Amazingly, since
fiscal 1972, there were only three years in which this did not occur, fiscal 1975, 1977 and
1979. Furthermore, in each case prior to 1987, the HAC submitted its report on or after
the date of the conference report on the Defense Authorization bill, so the HAC was aware
of the conference authorization levels. Thus, it would be accurate to say that this
independent behavior of the HAC was nearly an annual occurrence.
Surprisingly, even with over 30 changes from both the House and conference
authorized funding levels, the HAC recommendations did not occur because of a policy
agenda. In almost all cases the variance was due to budget revisions, fiscal constraints, or
accounting procedures.47 The only clear example of a policy concern surfaced in fiscal
1974, as the HAC made clear its desire to proceed with the Trident program at the original
47See Appendix I for detailed history of HAC interaction with the Trident program.
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pace. The appropriation recommendations for fiscal 1980 and 1985 could be indicative of
policy concerns, but both were negligible in contrast to overall program funding levels.
2. B-l*
From fiscal 1971 through fiscal 1990, the House appropriated without change the
HAC's recommendations for both B-l procurement and R&D.48 Interestingly, the HAC's
recommendations differed from the House's authorization bill on seven occasions for
procurement (fiscal 1976 transition, 1977, 1981-2, 1985-6, and 1990) and on nine
occasions for R&D (fiscal 1971. 1973, 1975-7, 1981-2, and 1986). As noted earlier, the
House had accepted, with one minor exception, the HASC recommendations without
change. The theory that this was simply paying deference to the administration was
dispelled as it was shown that the HASC altered the budget requests on a frequent basis.
In light of the HAC versus House statistics, it is insufficient to say that the House,
therefore, was only paying deference to the HASC, since a similar deference exists in the
latter relationship. Furthermore, the HAC changed the funding levels even more frequently
than did the HASC change budget requests.
Was the HAC then the driving force behind B-l policy? To answer this one must
consider another factor that affects the HAC recommendations. There is an important
legislative step that normally occurs between House action on the authorization bill and
HAC submission of its appropriation recommendations, and that is the House-Senate
conference on the authorization bill. When the authorization level of the conference report
is compared to the recommendations of the HAC, a different picture is presented. Here,
48See Appendix J for B-1 Appropriation fiscal data.
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four of the seven HAC procurement recommendations that differed from the House
authorized amount were in concurrence with the conference report. For R&D, this was
true for six of the nine cases.
This still means that on four occasions for procurement and three for R&D the
HAC altered both the House authorized amount as well as the conference authorized level.
The resultant HAC recommendation levels were sometimes significantly lower, particularly
the procurement amounts in fiscal 1985 and 1986. The primary reason for this seems to
have been the power of its chairman, Representative Addabbo of New York, who appeared
to make it a yearly ritual to reduce the B-l program.49 One would have to conclude, then,
that the House truly did play deference to the HAC as well as the HASC in matters
concerning the B-l program.
3. MX
The House frequently approved the MX recommendations of the HAC for both
procurement and R&D accounts.50 This mirrors the relationship between the HAC and the
House for the B-l and Trident programs, but differs significantly from the combative
relationship of the HASC and the House in matters concerning the MX. Only one time in
the history of the MX program did the House alter the HAC recommendation, and this
occurred for fiscal 1983 when the House deleted all procurement funding for the MX.51
49See Appendix K for summary of amendments to the Defense Authorization bill
pertaining to the B-1 program.
50See Appendix L for MX Appropriation fiscal data.
51 See Appendix M for summary of amendments to the Defense Appropriation bill
pertaining to the MX program.
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The HAC had recommended $988 million, the amount authorized in conference and
adopted in the authorization bill by both houses. Restrictive language would allow the
original funds to be appropriated, however, if both houses by concurrent resolution
authorized the cut funding for appropriation by 1 April 1983. This decision would be
affected by Soviet willingness to engage in meaningful discussions at the START talks.
As was the case with the B-l and Trident programs, the HAC recommendations
did not have a strong correlation to either the House or conference authorized amounts.
Further analysis reveals, however, that these differences were rarely of a policy nature.
Instead, the differences were based largely on timing and budget revisions that the
authorization process could not incorporate, or on accounting procedures.
4 . Summary of HAC versus House
An analysis of all three programs reveals that although the HAC forwarded
appropriation recommendations which varied frequently from the prior approved House
and conference authorization amounts, there is insufficient evidence to say the HAC played
a significant role. First, although there was a strong correlation between the House and
HAC recommendations, only in the case of the B-l bomber could one say that there was a
deferential relationship. As noted, this appears to be the result of Representative
Addabbo's vendetta against the B-l program. Second, almost all variances were accounted
for with valid monetary explanations, such as budget revisions, testing or construction
delays, or accounting procedures. In the final analysis, the HASC, whose
recommendations differed frequently from the budget request but were approved almost
without change in the House, was the real source of power as concerns the offensive
strategic nuclear weapons programs. But, when such a program reached the congressional
agenda, based on fear of accelerating the arms race, the House played an increasingly
significant role with the balance of power controlled by the "centrists."
42
Two forces, in particular, seemed to shape House action when the House defied
the committee recommendations. The first was that of the liberal arms control proponents,
who succeeded in greatly reducing the magnitude of the MX program in the mid-1980s.
The second was the House Democratic Caucus. The HASC, historically more hawkish
than the House, started to make much more moderate recommendations concerning the MX
program after 1985. This came after the caucus stripped the HASC chairman of power,
and sent a warning that further HASC actions should be more in line with mainstream
democratic thinking, particularly when they represent the House in conference.
43
IV. POWER WITHIN THE SENATE
A. SASC VERSUS THE SENATE
Similar to their House counterpart, the Senate exhibited a high degree of deference
towards the SASC for both the B-l and Trident programs. However, in marked contrast to
the House, the Senate also exhibited a deferential approach for the MX missile. Where the
Senate appeared to take a stand independent from that of the SASC was with the MX
basing issue. It will be shown, however, that even though the MX opponents could claim
victory on the Senate floor by reducing or eliminating funding for certain basing measures,
the victories were short-lived. The ultimate deployment of the MX was minimally affected.
This was most apparent when the Air Force-supported and Carter-backed "racetrack" plan
was abandoned by Reagan in lieu of interim basing in fixed silos.
1. Trident
The Senate authorized an amount other than that recommended by the SASC on
five different occasions, as shown below in Figure 9.52
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Figure 9: Trident Procurement Authorizations
Examination of the above cases, however, supports a deferential relationship.
For fiscal 1975, the Senate authorized $1 166.8 million for Trident submarine procurement,
$24.8 below the SASC recommendation. However, it was SASC chairman Stennis who
recommended this reduction since this funding was provided for in the fiscal 1974 defense
supplemental authorization.53
For fiscal 1983, the Senate reduced Trident procurement to $1961.5 million, a
$279.6 million cut. In addition, authorizations for Trident I missile procurement and
531974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 584.
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advance procurement were reduced by $3 million and $7 million, respectively. The Trident
reductions deleted all components associated with the Trident I missile, resulting from a
decision to equip the ninth and all later Trident submarines with only the Trident II
missile.54 This was actually a committee action, however. On May 5, the White House
and Senate Budget Committee Republicans agreed on an overall budget proposal, and
SASC chairman Tower agreed to help meet the targets. The Armed Services Committee
forwarded an amendment involving cuts totalling $2,379 billion, which included the
Trident reductions listed above.55 There was no action on the Senate floor to oppose this
portion of the amendment so this case did nothing to detract from the deferential
relationship.
The latter three cases involved relatively insignificant amounts in relationship to
overall program funding and reflected increasing fiscal constraints rather than policy
considerations. For example, in fiscal 1985 Trident procurement was reduced on the
Senate floor by $29.2 million to $1460.3 million, a two per cent reduction. The SASC
version of the Defense Authorization bill pushed for seven percent real growth, but it was
widely anticipated that only a five per cent real growth would be achieved as in the previous
two years.56 The final Defense Authorization bill did, in fact, reflect only a five percent
real growth from the year before.
54 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 78, 93.
55 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92-3.
561984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 42.
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Reagan's fiscal 1986 requests called for a 5.9 per cent real growth, but it was
apparent by May that zero real growth, as called for by the Senate, was more realistic. The
SASC recommendation for Trident procurement was $1208.6, 5.9 per cent below the
president's request. The Senate measure reduced this by another $25 million. In addition,
Trident I missile procurement was reduced by $10 million, beyond the $20 million
reduction in the SASC's bill, while Trident I missile R&D was increased by $10 million.
The Trident I proposed cuts were due to fiscal constraints "without prejudice".57 No
amendment was offered on the Senate floor affecting the Trident programs in fiscal 1986.
Finally, the Senate reduced the fiscal 1988 Trident procurement recommendation of
$1193.7 million to $1153.7 million, a three percent cut. Again, this cut was due to
budgetary pressure with no apparent policy considerations.
Thus, although there were differences on five occasions, the rationale behind the
reductions still supports a deferential relationship. Furthermore, there were only three
amendments forwarded on the floor of the Senate in the history of the Trident program that
would have affected the authorization level.58 Of these, only one was adopted, and that
was forwarded by Senator Stennis which accounted for the $24.8 million reduction in
fiscal 1975.
Evidence exists to show that this Senate deference was to its Armed Services
Committee and not to the administration. The SASC frequently recommended an
authorization level other than that requested by the administration. This occurred for eleven
57 U. S. Senate Report 99-41, 8.
58See Appendix N for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Authorization
bill pertaining to the Trident program.
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fiscal years (1972, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1990),
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Figure 10: Trident Procurement Authorizations
Trident Research and Development data reveals an even more complete
relationship of deference between the Senate and SASC. On only one occasion did the
Senate authorize an amount other than that recommended by the SASC for either the
Trident, Trident I, or Trident II programs. This occurred in fiscal 1986 when the Senate
authorized $42.2 million for Trident I R&D, while the SASC recommended only $32.2
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Figure 11: Trident R&D Authorizations
Apparently, the Senate was deferent to the SASC and not to the administration.
The SASC recommended funding levels different from the president's requests for ten
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Figure 12: Trident R&D Authorizations
As Figure 12 illustrates, the differences were almost negligible in comparison to
overall program funding. However, this reflects the SASC's interest in strategic nuclear
policy. For example, the SASC reports for fiscal 1976, 1976 transition, and 1977 defense
authorization bills recommended elimination of Trident II R&D funds. Although totalling
only $7 million dollars, these reductions expressed the Senate concern of proceeding with
the Trident II missile, a missile which could pose a first strike threat due to its increased
accuracy. Fiscal 1984 is another interesting case. Here, the SASC recommended an
additional $10 million for Trident II R&D. This was to provide sufficient funds to finish
development of a maneuverable warhead for the Trident n, a program which generated
significant debates along both arms control and ballistic missile defense lines. Again, this
was fiscally insignificant but had important policy considerations.
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Since fiscal 1973, not a single SASC recommendation which deviated from the
administration's request affected the Trident submarine. Rather, all the notable alterations
affected the Trident II missile program, a program which was on the congressional agenda
for several years. The last three alterations affected the Trident I missile program, but were
not significant as policy issues, since Trident I missile production was nearing an end and
mounting budgetary pressure made cuts almost mandatory.
2. B-l
Two of the ten proposed amendments that would have affected B-l authorizations
were adopted on the Senate floor.59 The first was in 1976 by Senator Culver and the latter
in 1986 by Senator Byrd. The Culver amendment, which was rejected 6-9 in the SASC
and subsequently adopted on the floor, deferred decision on B-l procurement in light of the
presidential elections and would give the new president the final say on whether funds
could be obligated. The Byrd amendment was relatively insignificant and emphasized that
no more than 100 B-lBs could be built, apparently to satisfy the doubts of some that B-2
funds would be used to continue production of the B-1B.
Over the 20 year history of the B-l program and its offshoots, these two
amendments would do little to detract from the otherwise unanimous deference paid to the
SASC in matters relating to the B-l. In fact, fiscal analysis reveals that there were no
differences between the authorization levels recommended by the SASC and those
approved by the Senate. The SASC had, however, recommended amounts different than
the budget requests 11 times (fiscal 1972, 1975, 1976 Transition, 1977, 1979, 1981,
59See Appendix O for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Authorization
bill pertaining to the B-1 program.
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1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1990).60 It would therefore be wrong to conclude that the
Senate was simply deferential to the administration and not the SASC.
3. M-X
Unlike the House, the Senate demonstrated a deferential role towards its armed
services committee in matters relating to the MX missile program. There were two
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Figure 13: MX Procurement Authorizations
60See Appendix C for B-1 Authorization fiscal data.
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First, for fiscal 1984, the Senate trimmed the SASC procurement recommendation
of $2,536 billion by $97.8 million. Then, for fiscal 1986, the Senate reduced the SASC
recommendations for MX procurement by $320 million to $1746.3 . 61
For the fiscal 1984 case, both of the Senate amendments which either tried to kill
the MX or to reduce funding were handily rejected, so it is likely that the $97.8 million
reduction was part of an overall budget compromise. However, the fiscal 1986 case does
reveal considerable Senate discontent with the MX program. First, Reagan endorsed a
Nunn amendment which halved the number of MXs planned for deployment in existing
silos "to avert near-certain defeat in the Senate on the MX missile." Second, the Nunn
amendment reduced the number of MXs authorized in fiscal 1986 to 12. This provision
also expressed the sense of the Senate in limiting future procurement and deployment of the
MX missiles.62
The Senate was certainly not deferential to the administration, however, when it
came to MX procurement, particularly in fiscal 1983 and thereafter. In fiscal 1983, the
administration requested over $1.4 billion to begin MX missile procurement but the SASC
recommended zero, a figure later approved by the Senate. In addition, the SASC
procurement recommendations were below the administration's request for fiscal 1985,
1986, and 1988, while it was greater than the request for fiscal 1984. Thus, the SASC
altered the procurement requests six out of the first seven years. This is illustrated below in
Figure 14.
61 See Appendix P for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Authorization
bill pertaining to the MX program.
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Figure 14: MX Procurement Authorizations
MX R&D funding reveals an even greater degree of Senate deference to the
SASC. As shown in Figure 15 below, the Senate never altered the SASC
recommendations. For a program which generated the degree of controversy associated
with the MX, the amazing fact that the Senate failed to change its Armed Services
Committee's recommendation even once is indicative of a highly deferential relationship,
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Figure 15: MX R&D Authorizations
Again, the above relationship cannot be dismissed as one in which the Senate was
only paying deference to the administration. As Figure 16 shows below, the SASC
frequently altered the administration's MX R&D request. This occurred in the first three
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Figure 16: MX R&D Authorizations
B . SAC VERSUS THE SENATE
Compared to the interaction of the SASC and the Senate, there were very few
differences between the SAC recommendations and the Senate approved appropriations
bills. However, as in the case with the House, this apparent deference needs further
examination.
1. Trident
There were only two years in which the Senate appropriated an amount for
Trident programs differing from that recommended by the SAC, and in each case the
monetary differences were minimal. First, in fiscal 1984, the Senate increased the SAC
recommendation for Trident II missile R&D by $10 million to $1,506.4 million. Then, in
fiscal 1988, the Senate reduced the SAC recommendation for Trident procurement from
56
$1193.7 million to $1153.7 million and increased Trident II missile R&D from $560.9
million to $580.9 million. 63
The 1984 decision to add $10 million for Trident II missile R&D was a small
portion of a $350.6 million amendment offered by Carl Levin, D-Mich, which was
negotiated with the influential Ted Stevens, R-Alaska. This additional funding was to
develop a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) for the Trident II missile. Although this
could be considered a significant policy issue, it was not at the center of debate of the
proposed amendment, which was a counter to a Tower amendment that would have been
even more expansive than the Levin amendment. The two factors which most affected the
amendment passage (and defeat of Tower's) had no bearing on the Trident program.64
The fiscal 1988 case likewise does little to detract from the otherwise complete
deferential role of the Senate to the SAC. In this case, the Senate had already approved the
Defense Authorization bill on November 14 which incorporated the Senate's reduction of
$40 million from its Armed Services Committee's recommendation. The SAC
recommendation, reported on September 17, called for the same funding level as
recommended by the SASC. Thus, it is not a plausible proposition that the Senate's lack of
concurrence with the SAC demonstrates a lack of deference. In any case, the monetary
differences did not represent significant policy concerns and were insignificant in
comparison to overall Trident funding.
63See Appendix Q for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Appropriation
bill pertaining to the Trident program.
641983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 490.
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To determine whether the Senate was deferential to the SAC, it is also necessary
to analyze the SAC funding proposals relative those recommended by the SASC and agreed
to by the House and Senate in the authorization conference. A review of the authorization
and appropriation data shows that the SAC recommended different funding levels for the
various Trident programs than did the SASC in 17 various bills, including the 1974
Defense Supplemental and the 1976 transition period. However, in 15 of the 42 cases
included in these 17 years, the SAC recommendations concurred with the funding levels
agreed to in the authorization conference.
A few of the SAC recommendations varied quite significantly from those
recommended by the SASC and those agreed to by the authorization conferees. For fiscal
1974, the SAC cut Trident procurement by $240 million. This followed identical action
taken in the House and although it would not delay launching of the first Trident, it would
affect long-range procurement for the fifth through seventh submarines. This action was
fiscal in nature. Most opponents of the accelerated Trident program expressed concern
with possible cost overruns associated with building all of the Tridents at the same time.
The SAC restoration of $38.6 million for Trident procurement in fiscal 1976 was
earmarked for development of the Trident II missile and a Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle
(MaRV) for the Trident I. This was an important policy action because both programs
were controversial. The Trident II was considered premature while the MaRV was deemed
unnecessary due to SALT. In fiscal 1984, the SAC recommended a $10 million reduction
from the Trident II R&D authorized level of $1,506.4 million. Although fiscally
insignificant, this money was for development of a MaRV for the Trident II, and thus was
significant as a policy issue.
Fiscal 1990 witnessed the final notable change. Here, the SAC report denied
production funds for the Trident II missile based on the two "spectacular flight-test
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failures."65 This action, therefore, represented neither a policy nor a monetary initiative;
rather, it was a firm warning to the Navy to get the program back on track before any more
money would be allocated to it.
Most changes were rather insignificant, however, both from a monetary and
policy standpoint. The SAC's fiscal 1977 recommendation for Trident I R&D was $49
million higher than the authorization levels. But this funding, provided to conduct special
tests for the Trident missile motor, was included elsewhere in the Defense Authorization
bill. The Trident I procurement and advance procurement differences for fiscal 1977
involved cuts of less than one per cent and were also insignificant as a policy issue.
In the fiscal 1983 budget, the SAC's recommendations lowered funding for
Trident procurement, advance procurement, and R&D. These reductions were not policy
oriented, however, and were consistent with actions taken during the authorization process
when the decision was made to fund only one Trident submarine instead of the two
requested by the Pentagon. The $66 million reduction in Trident I missile procurement was
affected by the decision to equip the ninth and later Trident submarines with the Trident II
missile. The SAC thus decided to reduce from 72 to 66 the number of Trident I missiles to
be procured because the original production schedule was no longer required.
For fiscal 1984, the SAC recommended a $50 million reduction in Trident
procurement from the $1,452.5 million authorized. This reduction was due to the adopted
budget resolution which resulted in Pentagon cuts across the board and did not reflect a
policy issue with the Trident program.
651989 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 762.
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The fiscal 1985 SAC position for Trident procurement called for $7 million less
than that recommended by the SASC, a cut with no policy implications and trivial in
relationship to the $1.5 billion funded for this account. Reductions from the SASC
endorsed amount for Trident procurement and advance procurement were also
recommended by the SAC. Again, these were relatively minor and were made possible by
lower than anticipated inflation rates and Congressional disapproval of a classified
reprogramming action. Fiscal 1987 saw a repeat. This time, $10 million was trimmed
from the administration's request if $3.06 billion for the Trident II missile programs. The
SAC recommendations were $62.2 million shy of what the SASC wanted, however, but
still represented only a four per cent cut and contained no policy implications.
The SAC's Trident procurement recommendation for fiscal 1989 of $1123.7
billion was $107 million less than called for by the SASC. This action mirrored that of the
House, however, and was strictly a fiscal consideration. The appropriators predicted that
the ship would cost less than the budget had assumed, based on historical Trident costs
being lower than what had been bidden.
Thus, even though the SAC recommended funding levels different than did the
SASC on 42 occasions, it was rarely due to a policy initiative. In addition, since 1975 and
excluding the 1989 flight-test failures, the only time the SAC altered the recommendation
due to a policy concern was in fiscal 1984 when it deleted $10 million to develop a MaRV
for the Trident II missile. In all other cases, the SAC recommendation either concurred
with the authorization level agreed to in conference or was a relatively insignificant
reduction based solely on monetary considerations.
2. B-l
There was only one occasion in which the Senate changed the SAC
recommendation for the B-l program. This happened for the fiscal 1978 Defense
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Appropriation bill when the Senate deleted the entire B-l procurement request. This
occurred after President Carter announced, after SAC action, the cancellation of the B-l
program. Following this announcement, the SAC voted to endorse deletion of the original
procurement request. This case, therefore, fails to detract from the apparent deferential
relationship.
Of the five amendments offered on the Senate floor to the defense appropriations
bill, two were adopted.66 These amendments were offered by Senators Stennis and Nunn.
The 1977 amendments offered by then SASC Chairman Stennis deleted procurement funds
previously authorized following Carter's B-l decision. SASC Chairman Nunn's 1981
proposal required the president to certify to Congress a baseline cost of the B-l program
against which future cost increases could be measures. This measure proved to be of some
importance in future debates because requests made exceeding this established limit were
routinely altered or deleted.
Thus, the proposal of Chairman Stennis did not reflect a policy concern of
Congress contrary to that of the White House. Rather, it was a show of deference to the
President, who decided to cancel the B-l. Nunn's proposal appears to have been a
response to a fiscal concern of Congress, namely that of the high cost associated with the
B-l program. Although his proposal did not directly alter the number of B-lBs to be built
or affect the plane's characteristics, it did serve to constrain the program by establishing
permanent fiscal boundaries.
66See Appendix R for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Appropriation
bill pertaining to the B-1 program.
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The Nunn amendment of 1983 best illustrates the phenomenon of anticipatory
response. Had Nunn not offered the amendment, a more restrictive measure of the B- IB
program could have been adopted, adding credence to the belief that the non-committee
members of the Senate were gaining influence resulting from their policy concerns. By
preempting a more drastic measure, however, Senator Nunn placated the more extreme
policy concerns of the Senate and kept the B- IB program alive, a program supported in full
by the White House. Over a twenty year history of various versions of the B-l program,
however, it appears safe to say that the Senate was truly deferent, but it remains to be seen
if this was to the SAC or to the SASC.
The SAC, compared to the SASC, recommended different funding levels for the
B-l programs in 10 of the fiscal years under study. These ten years yielded 15 cases of
disagreement. However, in eight of these cases, the SAC proposals coincided with the
funding agreed to by the conferees for the companion authorization bills. The remaining
seven cases will thus be analyzed to determine if the SAC competed with the SASC for
influence.
In fiscal 1975, the SAC recommended $400 million for B-l R&D, $55 million
less than recommended by the SASC and subsequently agreed to in the authorization
conference. This action expressed the SAC's concern with the rising B-l cost estimates,
and was not a major policy issue. In fiscal 1982, the SAC recommendations, in
comparison to those of the SASC, included provisions to increase Long-Range-Combat-
Aircraft (LRCA) procurement by $92.2 million, to reduce LRCA advance procurement by
$76.2 million, and to increase LRCA R&D by $169 million. These differences were quite
significant, but were strictly monetary in nature. The SAC recommendations matched
those requested by the president, and added three percent to the procurement accounts to
cover added costs.
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In fiscal 1986, the SAC recommended $200 million less for B-1B procurement
compared to the SASC's recommendation of $5461.8 million, a four percent reduction.
This action was taken after the HAC had reduced funding by $600 million. The House
panel argued that the reduction would not affect the program because contractors were
bidding for parts of the project at lower rates than had been anticipated. The SAC agreed
with that rationale, but argued it was premature to assume that so much could be cut
now.67 This action, therefore, was also strictly monetary in nature.
The last two cases occurred in fiscal 1989 and 1990. In the former case, the SAC
recommended $24.5 million for B-1B modification, $2 million below that recommended by
the SASC. In the latter case, the SAC recommended $72 million for B-1B modification,
$11.5 million below that recommended by the SASC. Both cases reflected panel's
discontent with recent B-1B performance, and were reflective of the low budget priority to
fix the plane. In addition, the fiscal 1989 case deleted funding for programs the SAC
considered to be unnecessary. Both cases were insignificant both from a fiscal as well as a
policy standpoint.
The above cases show that although the SAC frequently recommended funding
levels for the various B-l programs different from the levels recommended by the SASC,
there was no major policy objective in doing so. The fiscal 1982 and 1986
recommendations were due to new cost information, the 1982 case requiring additional
funding for added costs while the 1986 case allowed for reductions due to lower bids. The
other cases similarly had no affect on the B-l programs, either in terms of aircraft
67 1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 381, 387.
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characteristics, numbers to be procured, or delivery schedules. Thus, although the earlier
fiscal analysis has shown the Senate to be deferent to the SAC, this deference is monetary
in nature only, with the SASC exhibiting influence when policy issues are at stake.
3. MX
The case of the MX is one of seemingly complete deference. The Senate
approved the SAC's recommended appropriation levels on every occasion. However,
there were 10 amendments offered on the Senate floor which would have affected the MX
program in the appropriation bill, and three of these were adopted.68
Interestingly, these adopted amendments were largely policy oriented, and unlike
the House, the central issue was the basing method and not the missile itself. Stevens'
1979 proposal ensured that none of the MX funds could be used to commit MX to any
specific basing mode; thus, of $230 million earmarked for development of the basing
mode, only $55 million could be used for the racetrack version. Cohen's 1981 measure
expressed dissatisfaction with Reagan's proposal to deploy the MX missiles in super-
hardened silos, and of the $354 million earmarked for development of the interim MX
basing mode, allowed only $20 million to be spent on super-hardened silo development.
Finally, Hart's 1982 amendment would block the first flight test of the MX until Congress
approved a specific method for basing the missile.
Even though the above amendments were of a policy nature, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the above actions had a significant impact on the MX program. None of
the adopted measures limited funding of the MX. The measures attempted to place sub-
68See Appendix S for summary of Senate amendments to the Defense Appropriation
bill pertaining to the MX program.
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limits on MX appropriations as related to the basing measure, but given the interim
deployment of MX missiles in fixed silos, they did not affect the ultimate fate of the
missile. The authorization process, in general, was far more significant towards the fate of
the MX program than was the appropriation process. Most of the key issues were decided
in the former process, such as placing a permanent limit of 50 on the number of MX
missiles to be deployed in silos.
Thus, even though the Senate appeared to be more concerned with policy matters
concerning the MX program than did the House, particularly in the appropriations process,
its concerns and measures undertaken appear to have had little affect on the MX's fate. The
minor monetary cuts and relatively minor delays in testing were probably useful in
placating concerns of the liberal arms control groups, but were in the long run rather
meaningless. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the Senate was therefore
deferential to the SAC as concerns the MX program, but the net affect of the Senate action
on the floor did little to detract from the program as recommended by the SAC over the
history of the MX program. This case certainly does not support the proposition that the
Senate had a strong policy concern with the MX, because if they had, the more drastic
amendments would have been adopted and the program's magnitude and characteristics
would have been curtailed or altered.
It is also useful to examine the relationship between the SAC's and the SASC's
recommendations. For the MX programs, the SAC recommended funding levels different
from those of the SASC for nine different fiscal years. On seven of these occasions, the
two panels disagreed on funding for MX procurement. In the first four procurement cases,
the SAC's recommendations coincided with the funding level agreed to in the authorization
conference. But, in fiscal 1987, 1989 and 1990, the SAC's recommendations for MX
procurement were different than both the SASC's and the authorization conference's.
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In fiscal 1987, the SAC recommended $1368.1 million for MX procurement, $50
million less than did the SASC. This cut did not result due to any policy issue, rather it
was a trimming needed because of the budget crunch.69 In fiscal 1989, the SAC only
recommended $732 million for MX procurement, $75 million below the SASC's report.
The Senate panel cited "lax bookkeeping in the program" as the reason for the cut.70
Finally, in fiscal 1990, the SAC recommended reducing MX procurement by $30 million to
$661 million, with no apparent rationale for the action. In each of the above cases, it is
apparent that the budget crunch was the primary reason for the SAC's altering of the MX
procurement funding level as recommended by the SASC, with no apparent policy issues at
stake.
For the various MX and related R&D programs, there were six occasions where
the SASC's recommendations were not agreed to by the SAC. On two of these occasions,
the SAC proposals were the same as the funding levels agreed to in the authorization
conference. In a third case, fiscal 1986, the SAC recommended a total of $624.5 million
for SICBM R&D, but $256 million was to come from prior year transfers to the SICBM
program. The Armed Services panel had requested funding of $624.5 million without
utilizing any transfers from money not spent in prior years. This is more of an accounting
difference which had no policy implications.
Addressing the other three R&D cases, fiscal 1982 saw the SAC recommending
$2008.7 million for MX R&D compared to the SASC recommendation of $2423.2.
691986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 215.
701988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 651.
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However, this case is not useful as a measure of influence because SAC action followed
Reagan's address in October in which he scrapped the long espoused mobile version of
MX in favor of interim deployment in existing silos. In the fiscal 1983 SAC report, MX
R&D funding was set at $2449.3 million. The SASC had recommended only $2277.3
million while the authorization conferees agreed to $2509.3 million. Although the SAC's
funding for MX R&D was $60 million less than the authorization conference report, no
specific policy issue was at stake. Rather, this was part of an overall reduction with the
SAC report providing $5.48 billion less than had been included in the companion defense
authorization bill.71 Finally, in the fiscal 1984 budget, the SAC cut $30 million from the
ICBM modernization program. This cut came from the $40 million request, which the
SASC recommended in full, to study the feasibility of deep under mountain basing.72 This
final case represents the only case with any policy implications, but was insignificant in
comparison to the billions appropriated each year for MX R&D.
A review of both MX procurement and MX R&D shows that the SASC was the
driving force behind Senate behavior. The apparent high degree of deference to the SAC
was monetary only in nature, with deference being paid to the Armed Services panel over
any substantive policy issues.
C. SUMMARY
Almost without exception, the Senate exhibited a high degree of deference to the two
committees most influential on defense matters. The one case where a significant change
71 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 286.
721983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 485.
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occurred was in 1977, when Carter announced his decision to cancel the B-l after the
SASC and SAC had already approved the president's original request for five B-ls. The
committees backed this decision, however, and were influential in gaining Carter his
victory. The actions the Senate adopted were largely sponsored by influential committee
members, particularly Senators Nunn and Stennis. These amendments did litde to change
the policy which originated in the SASC, and appear to have been forwarded to blunt more
drastic actions favored by other Senators. The fact that these committee powers placed
amendments to the defense authorizations and appropriations bill indicates that the Senate
did have some influence, however, over the contents of the proposed legislation. Had they
none, it is unlikely that the respective committee chairmen would have placed amendments
before the floor of the Senate. They certainly had sufficient power within their committees
to incorporate their provisions within the committee report had they so desired. It is
apparent that the case of anticipatory response makes for more subjective analysis. Taken
over the twenty year history of these three programs, however, these amendments,
incorporating relatively insignificant policy and monetary revisions, did litde to detract from
an otherwise completely deferential relationship, particularly that of the Senate to the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
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V. HOUSE VERSUS THE SENATE
A. DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL
After the House and Senate approve their respective versions of the Defense
Authorization Bill, several differences must be reconciled before it can be submitted to the
President and signed into law. Each chamber appoints conferees to represent its interests,
with the defense committee members normally comprising the bulk of the delegates. The
House and Senate majority leaders still maintain power in deciding who may go to
conference, but as was shown earlier, the Democratic Caucus can exert a strong amount of
influence at this step by influencing the selection the House conferees.
The Trident, B-l and MX programs are examined in detail below to develop a further
understanding of the relative power structure within Congress, when this balance changes,
and how it impacts on strategic nuclear weapon programs. Consistent with earlier analysis,
this section will first examine the results of the House-Senate conference on the Defense
Authorization bill.
1. Trident
Table 1, below, summarizes the compromises reached in conference during the
years in which the House and Senate Defense Authorization Bills included different
amounts for the various Trident programs.
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Table 1: Trident Authorizations
Fiscal Year Program House Senate Confereni
1972 Trident R&D 109.5 103 1(
1973 Trident R&D 555.4 535.4 535
1974 Supplemental Trident Procurement 24.8 24
1975 Trident I R&D 648.8 633.8 641
1976 Trident Procurement 573.4 602.6 602
Trident I R&D 687.5 732.5 725
1976 Transition Trident I R&D 161.5 171.5 165
Trident U R&D 1
1977 Trident Procurement 1520.3 791.5 791
Trident H R&D 3
1979 Trident Procurement 274.8 55 274
Trident I R&D 200 191.8 2(
Trident n R&D 5 15
1980 Trident U R&D 40.6 25
1981 Trident H R&D 16.5 97.9 (
1982 Trident Procurement 330.7 340.7 330
Trident II R&D 145 239.5 239,
1983 Trident Procurement 1786 2205.4 17*
Trident I Procurement 742.8 732.8 732,
1984 Trident II R&D 1496.4 1506.4 1506,
1985 Trident Procurement 1392.6 1725.8 1685,
Trident II Proc 152.4 162.9 157.
Trident II R&D 2051.1 2086.1 2075.
1986 Trident Procurement 1531.8 1431.8 1481.
Trident I Procurement 56.2 36.2 36.
Trident I R&D 30 42.2 38.
Trident II R&D 2100 2165.6 2130.
1987 Trident Procurement 1509.1 1446.
Trident R&D 41 51.8 4
Trident II R&D 1500 1632.9 159
1988 Trident Procurement 1330.8 1290.8 1290.
Trident II R&D 1000 1098.5 1073.
1990 Trident II Procurement 1814.6 1915.6 1514.1
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There were 33 "cases"73 in which Defense Authorization bills approved by the
House and Senate contained monetary differences for the Trident programs. But a cursory
review of the above data yields no quick conclusions as to whom was more influential.
There were several cases in which either the House or Senate appeared more influential. In
18 cases, one side's position was conceded to, 1 1 times in favor of the Senate and seven
times in favor of the House. In another 10 cases, the issue was resolved with one chamber
leaning towards the other. Eight times, these resolutions were towards the Senate's
position, while on only two occasions were they in the House's favor. In the remaining 5
cases, the differences were resolved by essentially splitting the difference.
Statistically, the above data would appear to favor the Senate. Excluding the five
cases which were resolved by splitting the difference, the House conceded to or leaned
towards the Senate's position on 19 of the remaining 28 cases, leaving the House with only
nine "victories". This is not enough to conclude that the Senate dominated, however.
Many of the "victories" were insignificant fiscally in comparison to the overall funding and
did not affect program development. For example, in fiscal 1973, the Senate authorization
for Trident R&D of $535.4 million was adopted, but this was less than four percent under
the House amount. In 1982, the House authorization for Trident procurement of $330.7
million was adopted, but this was less than three percent under the Senate amount. Thus, it
would be useful to examine the more flagrant differences.
The first apparent case was in the 1974 Defense Supplemental, with the House
recommending $24.8 million for Trident procurement and the Senate recommending zero.
73A case in the Trident program could be one of six elements, either Trident,
Trident I or Trident II procurement or Trident, Trident I or Trident II R&D.
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This was really an accounting difference because the Senate had scheduled to include this
amount in the fiscal 1975 Defense Authorization bill.74 The next major difference arose for
the initial funding of Trident II missile R&D. In the fiscal 1976 Transition and fiscal 1977
Defense Authorization bills, the House recommended one million and three million dollars,
respectively, while in each case the Senate recommended no funding, believing that it was
premature to fund the Trident II missile until problems of the Trident I were worked out.75
In each case, the Senate's position was adopted, thereby delaying develc nent of the
Trident II missile. Trident procurement was also an issue in fiscal 1977. The House added
$728.8 million for a second Trident submarine, but the Senate only recommended funding
for the one requested. The House conceded to the Senate in this matter, and in return
gained funding for four attack submarines instead of the two favored by the Senate.76
Thus, prior to fiscal 1979, the Senate appeared to dominate in the Defense Authorization
conference concerning the Trident programs, but as the fiscal 1977 case demonstrates,
significant concessions were involved.
The House had the upper hand in fiscal 1979 through fiscal 1983. In fiscal 1979,
the House won several concessions. Both Houses had agreed to delay authorization for the
eighth Trident submarine, but the House allowed $274.8 million to buy long lead-time
items for the next three submarines. The Senate had only recommended $55 million. The
House position was also endorsed in conference for Trident I procurement, in which $8.2
741974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 580.
751976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 288.
761976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 293.
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million was added to more easily add a MaRV in the future, as well as for Trident II R&D,
in which the House had cut the $15 million request to $5 million, complaining that the
program was too vague.77 The House was also successful in getting the Senate to agree to
a 19 percent funding cut for Trident procurement in fiscal 1983. Both Houses had
recommended significant cuts. The House's cut was larger, however, providing funding
for only one of the two submarine's requested. The Senate's cut was based on elimination
of funding for Trident I components following the decision to equip the ninth Trident
submarine with the Trident II missile. It is likely that the House cut would have been even
larger had it acted when the Senate had, since their funding assumed the tenth submarine
would be the first equipped with the new missile.78 The Senate was not idle during this
period, however. It was able to greatly increase Trident II R&D funding in fiscal 1980 and
and again in fiscal 1982.
Commencing with fiscal 1984, the Senate again seemed to win concessions on the
more contentious issues. In fiscal 1984, the House again conceded to the Senate's funding
level for Trident II R&D. Although the $10 million concession is trivial compared to a
$1.5 billion funding level for this program, the amount was significant because it would
allow development of a MaRV, a very controversial program in light of the on-going
START negotiations. Finally, in fiscal 1987 the Senate was able to get funding of over
$1.4 billion authorized for Trident procurement, a program for which the House wanted
zero funding.
77 1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 324, 335.
781982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 78, 86, 93, 99.
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The more detailed breakdown of the major differences above yields two
significant results. First, the issue most frequently disputed was R&D for the Trident II
missile. Here, the Senate was able to block initial development for two years, and then get
vasdy higher funding levels for this program. The major factor in their reversal to support
this program appears to have been the breakdown of SALT II following the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Second, the House was only able to win a major monetary concession in
fiscal 1983 when funding for one of the two requested submarines was deleted. This is the
same year the House rejected funds to produce the first five MX missiles. Both actions
appear to reflect the House's frustration with Reagan's arms control policy and were
probably enacted to gain leverage in this arena. Apparently this was successful. Reagan
significantly softened his stand on arms control by first proposing the START talks, and
then endorsing the 1983 Scowcroft Commission report, which integrated future strategic
weapons development with arms control progress.
2. B-l
The B-l differences between the House and Senate are listed below in Table 2.
Table 2: B-l Authorizations
Fiscal Year Program House Senate Conferei
1971 B-l R&D 100 50
1975 B-l R&D 499 455 4
1976 B-l Procurement 77
B-l R&D 672.2 597.2 6
1976 Transition B-l Procurement 31
B-l R&D 168.3 129.3 1
1979 B-l R&D 105.5
1980 B-l R&D 54.9 30 54
1981 SWL Procurement 200
ATSB Procurement 91
SWL R&D 400 3
B-l R&D 30.7
1985 B- IB R&D 400 508.3 4
1986 B-1B R&D 200.4 367.4 28C
1987 B- IB R&D 50 118.7 i
1989 B- IB Modify 24.5 26.5 25
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Statistically, the B-l cases demonstrate more balance between House and Senate
influence. There were 16 cases listed above in which the House and Senate approved
different monetary amounts in the Defense Authorization bill for the B-l programs. On
two occasions the conferees adopted the House's position, while on another two occasions
the Senate position was adopted. On five occasions, the monetary differences were
essentially split. In the remaining seven cases, the conferees leaned towards the House's
amount on five occasions and towards the Senate's on only two. This cursory review
would give a slight edge towards the House conferees as concerns B-l authorizations.
Prior to fiscal 1980 the House was successful at getting a reluctant Senate to
authorize the B-l program. The initial differences occurred in fiscal 1971 and 1975 over
B-l R&D. In the first case, the Senate was successful in halving the difference to a lesser
amount, and in the latter case the Senate was successful in getting its lower authorization
amount approved. Neither case, however, appears to have had a significant impact on the
B-l program. However, starting with fiscal 1976, when B-l procurement commenced, the
House was routinely successful in conference. In both the fiscal 1976 and 1976 transition
budgets, the Senate recommended no funding for the B-l procurement. But the House
emerged victorious as most of the requested funding was authorized. In the same budgets,
the Senate also conceded to the House concerning B- 1 R&D, authorizing higher amounts.
Fiscal 1980 witnessed a similar occurrence. Here, the House succeeded in gaining a
greater funding level for B-l R&D. Fiscal 1979, however, appears to be an exception.
The House recommended no funding for continued testing of the B- 1 while the Senate
recommended $105.5 million, to which the conferees essentially split the difference and
authorized $55 million. In this case, the House supported Carter's decision to cancel the
B-l bomber, explaining the reversal of its historic support for the bomber.
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Since fiscal 1980 there was no apparent domination by either side. The greatest
controversy occurred when President Reagan took office and requested a new strategic
bomber in the fiscal 1981 budget. The recommended programs included the Strategic
Weapons Launcher (SWL), Advanced Tactical Strategic Bomber (ATSB), and a follow-on
to the B-l. The conferees leaned towards the House position for R&D, authorizing $300
million for the SWL, but leaned towards the Senate in the procurement accounts,
authorizing $75 million of the $91 million requested by the Senate for a new bomber. In
the following Defense Authorization bills, the Senate routinely authorized a significantly
higher amount for the B-1B (the new designation for the SWL) than did the House, but in
most cases the conferees split the difference and in only one year, fiscal 1987, did they lean
towards one side, in this case the Senate.
The case of the B-l and its various derivatives, including the SWL and B-1B, is
interesting for a couple of reasons. First, similar to what was found in the Trident cases,
most of the differences centered around R&D, not procurement. Second, the House
appeared to have an overall upper hand, but this was only observed in a four year period,
from fiscal 1976 through fiscal 1979, which coincided with the only Democratic
administration during the period under study. Even in this period, it was only Carter's
election year in which the House gained most of its victories.
The fact that most of the differences occurred over the R&D budget is interesting
since there is less at stake fiscally. It is in the R&D phase, however, that many policy
issues are decided, such as mission design (standoff launcher versus penetrating bomber)
and platform characteristics (stealth versus conventional design). Does this therefore add
credence to Lindsay's hypothesis that Congress as a whole is more concerned with policy
issues? Probably not. First, as was shown in the previous two sections, the House and
Senate positions entering into conference were largely decided by the Armed Services
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committees, with almost total deference to their proposals on floors of the respective
chambers. Second, in most cases the differences were monetary in nature and were
simply split or involved a slight leaning to either the Senate or House position. There were
no cases in which either the Senate or the House conceded to the other with significant
policy implications. The most significant case saw the House yield to the Senate in fiscal
1981 by accepting zero procurement funding for the SWL, but in this case the Senate
yielded back by allowing $300 million for SWL R&D.
3. MX
Table 3 summarizes the compromises made in conference for the years in which
the House and Senate disagreed over MX missile and basing program funding levels.











1976 Transition MX R&D 15.3 14.3 14.3










MX R&D 2609.3 2277.3 2509.3
1984 MX Procurement 2102.2 2438.2 2102.2










ICBM Modernization 2340.8 2363.5 2345
1986 MX Procurement 921 1746.3 1746
ICBM Modernization 1866.2 431.2 1086
1987 MX Procurement 1114.7 1418.1 1114.7
ICBM Modernization 1575.5 1198.8 1610
1988 ICBM Modernization 1866.2 431.2 1086
1989 ICBM Modernization 732.9 790 890
1990 ICBM Modernization 614.8 889 889
The MX case, once again, varies significantly from both the Trident and B-l
cases. This time, it is unique because the conferees rarely split the differences; rather,
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either the House or Senate position was conceded to. Early Senate "victories" in the fiscal
1976 and 1976 transition budgets were fiscally insignificant.
The House did achieve a couple of significant victories. In fiscal 1983, the Senate
recommended no MX procurement be authorized, while the House approved nearly $1.5
billion. The compromise amount of $988 million was strongly in the House's favor, and
was most significant since this authorized the commencement ofMX procurement. Fiscal
1984 again witnessed a Senate concession to the House's position on MX procurement,
but was not very significant fiscally. Interestingly, the Senate had approved a higher
amount for MX procurement, in opposition to the previous year's recommendation.
Commencing with fiscal 1984, however, the Senate really did dominate the
conference, particularly with the ICBM modernization programs. These programs included
several basing proposals for the MX (interim silo-basing, rail-mobile, and deep basing) and
SICBM development. Generally, the Senate entered conference having authorized a much
higher funding level for both ICBM modernization and MX procurement in fiscal 1985
through 1987. In most cases, the Senate figure was adopted, with fiscal 1987 being the
exception. Here, the House was successful in reducing MX procurement while increasing
ICBM modernization funding.
Statistically, the 19 cases involving disagreements yielded eight concessions to the
Senate and only five to the House. On balance, this tilts the scale in favor of the Senate.
The separate cases appear to support this conclusion. In the mid-1980s, when the MX
program met with significant congressional opposition, the Senate was able to get its higher
funding levels approved. Supporting this assessment is the fact that the Democratic Caucus
rebuked the House leadership and removed the chairman of the HASC from power, first in
1985 and then, temporarily, in 1987. Furthermore, the Caucus appointed special delegates
to deal in any matters involving arms control, of which the MX was one, believing the
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House conferees were too willing to compromise to their Senate counterparts. This fact
indicates that the Senate indeed won at the bargaining table, but that this victory was at the
expense of an ill-represented House. It appears, however, that the House was willing to
yield on the MX issue in order to gain White House concessions in its arms control
position. This was explored in some detail in the section analyzing the HASC
authorizations versus the House.
The case of the MX is also unique because disagreements over procurement
funding occurred every year from fiscal 1983 through fiscal 1987. This can best be
explained by the unique characteristics of the MX missile, to include multiple warheads,
hard-target kill capability, and fixed- silo basing. These attributes, either alone or in
combination, were open targets for the liberal arms control proponents who viewed this
weapon in its proposed basing as a highly destabilizing weapon. This was not the case
with the B-l and Trident programs, even though the Trident missiles, particularly the
Trident II, possessed some of these characteristics. The key appears to have been the issue
of survivability. The MX proponents were never able to make a convincing argument that
the MX could be survivable (particularly since Reagan rebuked Carter's plan as
unsurvivable and this plan was much more expansive than Reagan's subsequent proposals)
and thus the arms control proponents were successful in conveying the message that this
was a "use it or lose it" weapon. The only apparent leverage that the proponents had was
using the MX as a bargaining chip in the START negotiations, and as seen by the
numerous Senate victories in conference and the ultimate deployment of the MX missile,
this was a persuasive argument. As stated earlier, however, this resulted in White House
concessions to the House concerning arms control matters.
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B . DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL
1. Trident
Table 4 (next page) summarizes the compromises reached in conference for the
years in which the House and Senate appropriated varying amounts for the Trident
submarine and Trident missile programs.
As was the case with authorizations, the Senate appears to have dominated the
Defense Appropriation's conference concerning the Trident programs. In the 41 cases the
conferees had to resolve monetary differences, the Senate only conceded on seven
occasions, five times accepting the House position and twice leaning towards theirs. Of the
remaining cases, there were 12 approximate splittings of the difference, a leaning towards
the Senate position on three occasions, and adoption of the Senate position on 19
occasions. Excluding the splits, the Senate's position was favored over three times more
frequently than was the House's.
A further analysis shows that although most of the House's victories were very
minor, some were significant. Examples of the minor concessions gained included a $5
million cut in fiscal 1984 Trident procurement from an account exceeding $1.7 billion, a
similar occurrence for fiscal 1985 Trident I procurement, and cuts in Trident R&D in fiscal
1987 and 1990 which had minimal policy impacts. The House appears to have achieved
significant gains, however, first in fiscal 1979 by boosting Trident procurement and then in
fiscal 1990 by cutting Trident II R&D and greatly increasing Trident II procurement
The House and Senate positions in conference for the 1979 Defense
Appropriation bill were identical to their authorizing counterparts. Both had deleted all
funding for the eighth Trident submarine due to construction delays, but the Senate also
drastically reduced funding for long lead-time components to $55 million, a fifth of the
House amount. The Senate conceded to the House's position. For fiscal 1990, the Senate
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conferees pushed to delete procurement funding for the Trident II missile due to test-flight
failures. Although they yielded to the House position of $1.22 billion, $375 million less
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than requested by the administration, a provision was added which prevented the Pentagon
from spending more than $250 million of the appropriation until the Navy conducted three
successful flight tests. The Senate had added $70 million to the Trident II R&D account to
facilitate redesign, but this was rejected in conference. 79 Although very significant
amounts of money were involved in this latter case, the House is not a clear cut winner.
On the surface, their recommendations for both Trident II procurement and R&D were
accepted. However, the Senate-backed increase in Trident II R&D was not necessary with
the greater procurement funding, and spending of more than $250 million of the
appropriation was blocked until the Trident II demonstrated acceptable performance.
On the Senate side, many of the victories were not very significant fiscally, but
some carried important policy considerations. In fiscal 1977, 1979 and 1980, the Senate's
position of eliminating or greatly curtailing Trident II R&D funds was approved. Most of
the other concessions were simply monetary in nature and were generally insignificant in
comparison to overall funding levels. The only times the House conceded to the Senate
position requiring the House to alter its position by more than 10 percent occurred in fiscal
1986 and 1990 for Trident procurement and in the above cases involving Trident II R&D.
The appropriations process concerning the Trident programs differed from the
authorizations process in a couple of manners. First, many differences arose in the
procurement accounts, accounting for 22 of the 41 cases. Of the 31 differences in the
authorization conference, there were only 14 procurement cases. Second, neither the
House nor the Senate argued a consistent position. The Senate tended to recommend
79 1989 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 762, 771
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higher amounts for Trident I R&D, generally argued for higher Trident procurement
through fiscal 1986 but recommended lower funding for this program in each year starting
with fiscal 1987, recommended lower funding for Trident II R&D through fiscal 1980 but
higher levels commencing with fiscal 1981, and recommended higher amounts for Trident
II procurement in fiscal 1985, 1986 and 1988, but lower amounts in fiscal 1987 and
especially fiscal 1990.
2. B-l
Table 5, below, summarizes the compromises reached in conference for the years
in which the House and Senate appropriated varying amounts for the B-l or B-l derivative
programs.
Table 5: B-l Appropriations
Fiscal Year Program House Senate Conference
1975 B-l R&D 45 400 445
1976 B-l Procurement 64 64
B-l R&D 642.2 597.2 597.2
1976 Transition B-l Procurement 23 23
B-l R&D 158 129 129
1978 B-l Procurement 1310.6
1979 B-l R&D 105.5 55 55
1981 SWL Procurement 75
N.S.B. Procurement 175 300 300
1982 LRCA Procurement 1801 1958 1801
LRCA R&D 291.9 471 291.9
1985 B-1B Procurement 6671.4 7102.6 7071
B- IB R&D 400 508.3 465
1986 B-1B Procurement 4861.8 5261.8 5161.8
Prior Year Transfer 300
1987 B-1B R&D 50 118.7 118.7
1990 B-1B Modify 19.1 72 51
B- IB R&D 50
There were 18 cases in which the House approved a different amount than did the
Senate in the Defense Appropriation bill pertaining to the B-l programs. Neither chamber
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dominated statistically, with the House conceding to the Senate on ten occasions, three
more times than did the Senate for the House. There was only one difference that was
essentially split down the middle, this occurring for B-l R&D in fiscal 1985. Thus, a
further examination is required to see if one chamber in fact had more influence than the
other.
The initial victories, important ones at that, went to the House. This was
indicated by higher funding levels for B-l R&D in fiscal 1975, and the decision to
commence B-l procurement in fiscal 1976, overriding the Senate's recommendation of no
procurement in both the fiscal 1976 and 1976 transition budgets. The lone Senate gain in
this time frame was a $45 million and a $29 million reduction in B-l R&D funding in fiscal
1976 and 1976 transition, respectively. Monetarily, this House concession almost
balanced the gains made in B-l procurement, but was no match policy-wise as B-l
procurement was able to commence.
The Senate appeared to achieve a major victory in fiscal 1978 when their position
of no funding for B-l procurement was approved over the House's position of over $1.3
billion. This was solely due to timing, however, because Carter's cancellation
announcement of the B-l came after House action on the Defense Appropriation bill and
prior to Senate action. The Senate was able to cut B-l R&D in half in fiscal 1979, the
purpose of which was to conduct flight tests of the cancelled bomber. Thus, prior to
Reagan's assumption of the presidency, the House dominated the Senate concerning the B-
1 bomber.
The second phase of the B-l program, soon to be called the B-1B, commenced in
fiscal 1981 with various proposals for a B-l follow-on. The Senate proposal called for
$300 million to begin development of a New Strategic Bomber (NSB) and $75 million to
procure engines for the new bomber. The House wanted no procurement funding and only
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$175 million for R&D. The House's conceded to the Senate in accepting the higher
amount for R&D while the Senate conceded by accepting the House recommendation for
zero procurement. However, a provision was added which would the Pentagon to use
some of the R&D for procurement once the Pentagon decided what bomber to buy, thereby
mitigating the Senate concession.80
In fiscal 1982, the House dominated. Its significantly lower funding amounts for
both Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA) procurement and R&D were adopted.
However, beginning with fiscal 1985, the Senate clearly dominated. First, the Senate was
able to gain higher funding levels for B-1B procurement in fiscal 1985, 1986 and 1990.
The Senate was also successful in beating back the House attempt to finance fiscal 1986
procurement with prior year funding. The lone House gain in this period was the
elimination of B-1B R&D funding in fiscal 1990.
Thus, it could be argued that the House was most influential with the B-l phase
but the Senate controlled the latter, or B-lB phase. The Senate provision forwarded by
SASC Chairman Nunn in fiscal 1981 was also incorporated which required the president to
certify to Congress a baseline cost of the B-l program against which future cost increases
could be measured. This provision was frequendy cited in later years and was effective in
keeping a lid on B-1B spending. Thus, the Senate also wielded influence by pushing for
strong conference report language.
80Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 197.
85
3. MX
Table 6, below, summarizes the compromises reached in conference during years
in which the House and Senate appropriated varying amounts for the MX missile and
basing programs.
Table 6: MX Appropriations
Fiscal Year Program House Senate Conferenc
1976 Adv ICBM Technology 38 40.1 3
1976 Transition Adv ICBM Technology 12.9 14.3 12.!
1977 MX R&D 84 69 6!
1981 MX R&D 1444.9 1564.9 1504.!
1982 MX R&D 1913.2 2008.7 1913.:
1983 MX Procurement 988 i
MX R&D 2509.3 2449.3 2509.:
1984 ICBM Modernization 354 584 47!
1985 MX Procurement 1580.9 2352.2 85:
Prior Year Procurement 1501
ICBM Modernization 2340.8 2345 2340.!
1986 ICBM Modernization 1483.6 1274.8 1480.1
1987 MX Procurement 1114.7 1368.1 1114;
ICBM Modernization 1575.5 1116.8 16K
1988 ICBM Modernization 1866.2 431.2 1081
1989 MX Procurement 807 732 80'
ICBM Modernization 732.9 790 891
1990 ICBM Modernization
The MX program yielded 17 cases of differences, with the House being the clear
statistical winner. Excluding three splittings of the difference, the House position was
adopted on 10 occasions and heavily leaned towards on one. The Senate gained two clear
concessions and one disputable one in fiscal 1985.
An examination of the Senate gains does not offset the significance of the above
statistics. In fiscal 1977, their proposal to appropriate $69 million for MX R&D was
adopted over the House's proposal of $84 million. In fiscal 1989, the conferees decision
to spend $890 million on ICBM modernization leaned towards the Senate, who had
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appropriated $790 million, $57. 1 million more than did the House. This resolution was
more than either chamber had appropriated, however, and detracts from the Senate victory
because it included significant funding for the SICBM, a program which the Senate was
trying to minimize.
The questionable Senate victory of fiscal 1985 followed a heated debate. The
Senate had proposed nearly $2.4 billion for MX procurement while the House only
approved $1.58 billion. The conferees agreed to only appropriate $852 million, and
another $1.5 billion would be freed on April 1 of 1986 following consenting votes in both
chambers to authorize and appropriate that amount. This additional appropriation would be
contingent on Soviet progress in the START talks. If approved, the $1.5 billion together
with the $852 million would equal the original Senate proposal, but if defeated, would be a
strong victory for the House. Hindsight shows this to be a Senate victory. The $1.5
billion was appropriated, but only after a bitterly won battle in Congress, requiring
significant presidential bartering as well as the calling in of negotiators from Geneva to
back the president's bargaining chip argument.
In all other cases, the House was predominant. This was usually characterized by
a reduction of MX procurement funds and an increase in ICBM modernization funds.
These apparently contradictory actions were actually consistent, illustrating the House's
dislike for the MX program and its desire to build the SICBM, a program included in the
MX R&D account.
C. SUMMARY
The detailed analysis above of the differences between the House and the Senate and
the compromises reached during the authorization and appropriation conferences failed to
yield a significantly dominant player. A recap of the analysis, however, points towards
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some interesting trends in relative power between the House and the Senate and suggests
possible causes for these trends.
1. Trident
In the authorization conference, the Senate was dominant prior to fiscal 1979 and
and after fiscal 1983. The House was dominant in fiscal 1979 and 1983 with the Senate
getting its way in fiscal 1980 and 1982. By separating the Trident into its program
elements, however, a clearer picture is presented. The Senate victories prior to fiscal 1979
and in fiscal 1980 and 1982 all involved R&D for the Trident II missile. The other cases,
involving House victories in fiscal 1979 and 1983 and a Senate victory in fiscal 1987, all
involved procurement for the Trident submarine.
Not surprisingly, the trend was quite similar in the appropriation conferences.
The Senate gained House concessions repeatedly in support of its position concerning the
Trident II missile. The lone clear-cut House victory occurred in fiscal 1979 when a higher
funding level for Trident advance procurement was adopted. Fiscal 1990 was monetarily a
significant victory for the House, but the provisions added in the conference report
effectively supported the Senate's position by limiting Trident II funding until successful
flight tests were demonstrated.
2. B-l
In the authorization conference, the House succeeded in fighting for B-l funding
prior to 1980, while neither side dominated the funding for the later B-1B bomber. All of
the House victories, however, came during Carter's presidency, the only time period in the
study when the Democratic-dominated House had the support of a Democratic president.
The appropriation conferences yielded clearer victories. Prior to 1980, the results
were similar with the House being more successful in getting its position adopted. In
addition, the House conferees were successful in significantly trimming the LRCA
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appropriations in fiscal 1982. After that, however, the Senate clearly dominated, getting
the House to concede to its position regarding the B-1B in fiscal 1985, 1986 and 1990.
Thus, it is still accurate to say that the House dominated during the B-l phase while the
Senate dominated the B-1B phase. However, the transition phase was cloudier with the
House appearing to be more influential.
3. MX
In the authorization conference, the House won a major victory in fiscal 1983 by
obtaining procurement authorization for the first five MX missiles. The Senate dominated
in every year since. As explained earlier, however, the House appeared to use the MX
missile program primarily as a lever. In reluctantly supporting funding for this
controversial program, the House forced the Reagan administration to soften its stance on
arms control.
The House was more successful in the appropriation conference than in the
authorization conference. This was especially true in the middle and latter half of the 1980s
when the House was successful at reducing the funding for the MX missile and supporting
basing while increasing funding for the SICBM. One could speculate that the reason why
the House was more successful in the appropriation process is that it had conceded to the
Senate in the authorization process to gain arms control leverage. There appears to be some
merit to this idea, with Republican Senators attempting to delay the authorization
conference to coincide with the appropriation conference so they would only have to "cut a
deal" with the Democratic House once.81
81 1984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 34.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The evidence overwhelmingly supports the proposition that the respective Armed
Services Committees are normally dominant in matters concerning strategic nuclear
weapons programs. This is supported both by the extreme degree of deference paid to
these committees by the floor members concerning funding levels and by the very low
passage rate of amendments against the committees' recommendations. In addition, the
respective appropriation committees also exhibited a high degree of deference towards their
authorizing committees concerning strategic nuclear weapon policy. Although the data
reveals that the appropriators frequently changed the final funding levels, these were rarely
of a policy nature. Rather, they reflected compromises reached in the authorization
conferences, fiscal constraints imposed by the budget resolutions, changing funding
requirements since the authorization committees took action, or accounting practices. Only
in the case of the B-l program did one of the appropriation committees appear to impact
program development, in this case the House Appropriation Committee led by
Representative Addabbo.
In analyzing the authorization process in the House of Representatives, it was found
that the three cases failed to support Lindsay's conclusion that it is policy concerns vice
deference which drives congressional behavior when a strategic nuclear weapon program
reaches the congressional agenda. This was true for the MX, but not for the B-l and
Trident programs. It appeared that House actions were dictated by policy concerns only
when there was fear of accelerating the arms race or fear of damaging the arms control
environment. Furthermore, the Trident programs were less vulnerable to House cuts and
restrictions because the Trident submarine platform was viewed as invulnerable to surprise
attack and MX critics felt a need to cover their political flanks.
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Analysis of the House appropriation process revealed that the HAC forwarded
appropriation recommendations which varied frequently from the prior approved House
and conference authorization amounts. However, there was insufficient evidence to say the
HAC played a significant role. Only in the case of the B-l bomber could one say that there
was a deferential relationship, but as noted earlier, this appears to have been the result of
Representative Addabbo's vendetta against the B-l program. Furthermore, almost all
variances were accounted for with valid monetary explanations, such as budget revisions,
testing or construction delays, or accounting procedures. In the final analysis, the HASC
was the real source of power within the House as concerns the offensive strategic nuclear
weapons programs. But when such a program reached the congressional agenda, based on
fears of accelerating the arms race or harming the arms control environment, the House
played an increasingly significant role with the balance of power controlled by the
"centrists," and the liberal arms control activists gaining power via the Democratic Caucus.
In the Senate authorization and appropriation processes, a high degree of deference to
the two committees most influential on defense matters was observed. The actions the
Senate adopted were largely sponsored by influential committee members, particularly
Senators Nunn and Stennis. These amendments did little to change the policy which
originated in the SASC, and appear to have been forwarded to blunt more drastic actions
favored by other Senators. Taken over the twenty year history of these three programs,
however, these amendments did little to detract from an otherwise completely deferential
relationship, particularly that of the Senate to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The authorization and appropriation conferences failed to yield a significantly dominant
player, but some interesting trends were observed. For Trident authorizations, the Senate
emerged victorious in battles over R&D for the Trident II missile. But in cases involving
procurement for the Trident submarine, there was greater balance, with the House gaining
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victories in fiscal 1979 and 1983 and the Senate winning in fiscal 1987. In the
appropriation conferences, the Senate gained House concessions repeatedly in support of
its position concerning the Trident II missile. The lone clear-cut House victory occurred in
fiscal 1979 when a higher funding level for Trident advance procurement was adopted.
In the B-l authorization conferences, the House succeeded in fighting for B-l funding
prior to 1980, while neither side dominated the funding for the later B-1B bomber. All of
the democratically-controlled House victories came during Carter's presidency, however.
The appropriation conferences yielded clearer victors. Prior to 1980, and in fiscal 1982,
the results were similar with the House being more successful in getting its position
adopted. After that, however, the Senate clearly dominated, getting the House to concede
in fiscal 1985, 1986 and 1990. Thus, the House dominated during the B-l phase while the
Senate dominated the B-1B phase. The transition phase was cloudier with the House
appearing to be more influential.
In the authorization conferences involving the MX, the House won a major
victory in fiscal 1983 by obtaining procurement authorization for the first five MX missiles.
The Senate dominated in every year since. As explained earlier, however, the House
appeared to use the MX missile program to force the Reagan administration into softening
its stance on arms control. The House was more successful in the appropriation
conference. This was especially true in the middle and latter half of the 1980s when the
House succeeded in reducing funding for the MX missile and supporting basing while
increasing funding for the SICBM.
However, when a program reached the congressional agenda, significant
congressional opposition was generated. Only in the case of the MX program, however,
did achievement of the agenda result in significant program changes. This resuL requires a
refinement of Lindsay's hypothesis. It is insufficient to say what program characteristics
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place a strategic weapon program onto the congressional agenda since reaching the agenda
does not necessarily affect the program. Rather, it is necessary to see what program
characteristics cause it to reach the congressional agenda and solicit sufficient opposition so
as to significantly alter the program.
This study suggests that if a strategic nuclear weapon program generates a fear of
accelerating an arms race or harming arms control efforts, then it will solicit sufficient
congressional opposition so as to result in significant program changes. Furthermore, this
study has found the Democratic Caucus to play a central role under such circumstances.
This forum was successfully used in two ways by the liberal arms control activists in the
House. First, they held future development of the MX program hostage to gain
concessions in President Reagan's arms control posture. To ensure they had credible
backing, the arms control activists threatened the House leadership and the HASC chairmen
with their jobs. Second, the arms control activists succeeded in funding a more "arms
control friendly" program, the SICBM, by tying acquisition and deployment of the MX
missile to developments made in the SICBM program.
The rise of the Democratic Caucus tilted the typical distribution of power in two
manners. First, in the House of Representatives, it forced the HASC to take a more dovish
stance in its position concerning strategic nuclear weapons programs. To ensure their
views were carried forward to the conference, they succeeded in getting the House Speaker
to send special delegates to oversee the conferees in discussions concerning arms control
provisions. They even went so far as to allow only their special delegates to participate in
conference discussions concerning arms control. Second, the rise of the Caucus shifted
power away from the Republic-controlled Senate in the mid-1980s. The evidence of this
was the reluctant Senate support of the SICBM program and the adoption of House-
sponsored, MX-limiting provisions.
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These findings are most significant for the future. They clearly demonstrate that in
formulating future strategic nuclear weapons programs, the Defense Department and
administration must be very mindful of the impact such programs will have on both the
current and future arms control negotiations as well as on a potential arms race. One
example is the potential modernization of nuclear-armed SLCMs. Given the potential for
an order of magnitude increase in accuracy and a tripling of range, numerous naval vessels
and aircraft could have the capability to destroy deep inland strategic targets. This would
cross a threshold in weapons technology and sew the seeds for a significant departure in
nuclear war fighting doctrine. In addition, it could require U.S. adversaries to pursue a
similar course, opening a new chapter in arms development. Finally, it would make
SLCMs a strategic asset, making such weapons susceptible to intrusive arms control. This
prospect should be of vital concern to Navy strategic planners. This is not to say that the
United States is developing such a weapon or planning to change its nuclear doctrine.
Rather, it shows the possible aspects such a program would possess, aspects which would
likely solicit significant congressional opposition and either link future development to
concessions in arms control or result in serious program reductions, similar to what the
MX program experienced.
In addition to showing what attributes of a nuclear weapon program will cause it to
reach the congressional agenda, this study has in addition revealed what characteristics will
make it susceptible to significant cuts and to linkage in arms control negotiations.
Furthermore, it has shown how the distribution of power within Congress is apportioned
in varying circumstances. This should make it apparent to strategic planners that it may no
longer be sufficient to simply get the backing of the Armed Services Committee to ensure
smooth program development. As part of the planning process, if it appears that if a future
weapon program is going to possess the characteristics which will solicit congressional
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opposition, it is imperative that a sound rationale for such a program also be formulated.
This will be necessary to placate liberal arms control activists, both to prevent significant
program cuts and to prevent linkage of development of such a program to arms control.
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APPENDIX A: TRIDENT AUTHORIZATIONS












































361 361 361 361 361
10 10 10 10 10
555.4 555.4 555.4 535.4 535.4
867.8 867.8 867.8 867.8 867.8
5 5 5 5 5
125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6
529 529 529 529 529
1166.8 1166.8 1166.8 1191.6 1166.8
11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.3
107.2 107.2 107.2 107.2 107.2





































































































































212.9 212.9 212.9 212.9 212.9
1703.2 1703.2 1703.2 1703.2 1703.2
919.1 919.1 919.1 919.1 919.1
213.6 213.6 213.6 213.6 213.6























FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
R&D (Trident) 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6 68.6
R&D (Trident I) 327.7 327.7 327.7 327.7 327.7 327.7




Current Year Advance 274.8 274.8 274.8 55 55 274.8
TOTAL 1186.7 274.8 274.8 55 55 274.8
PROCUREMENT 723.4 723.4 723.4 723.4 723.4 723.4
(Trident I)
Current Year Adv 166.4 166.4 166.4 166.4 166.4 166.4
TOTAL 889.8 889.8 889.8 889.8 889.8 889.8
R&D (Trident) 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.8
R&D (Trident I) 191.8 200 200 191.8 191.8 200
R&D (Trident II) 15 5 5 15 15 5
1979
SUPPLEMENTAL
R&D (TRIDENT H) 20 20 20
1?80
PROCUREMENT 1106.9 1106.9 1106.9 1106.9 1106.9 1106.9
(Trident)
Current Year Advance 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2
TOTAL 1121.1 1121.1 1121.1 1121.1 1121.1 1121.1
PROCUREMENT 676.6 676.6 676.6 676.6 676.6 676.6
(Trident I)
Current Year Advance 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5
TOTAL 763 763 763 763 763 763
R&D (Trident)




































































172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7
869.6 869.6 869.6 869.6 869.6
80 80 80 80 80
36.9 16.5 16.5 97.9 97.9
75
230.7 330.7 330.7 265.7 265.7
1291.5 330.7 330.7 340.7 340.7
665.1 665.1 665.1 665.1 665.1
244.8 244.8 244.8 244.8 244.8
909.9 909.9 909.9 909.9 909.9
102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8
239.5 145 145 239.5 239.5
1961.5
243.9 243.9 282 243.9 243.9
2485 2485 1786 2485 2205.4
699.5 699.5 699.5 699.5 696.5
43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 36.3
742.8 742.8 742.8 742.8 732.8
90.6 90.6 90.6 90.6 90.6























FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
1984
PROCUREMENT 1525.6 1452.5 1452.5 1452.5 1452.5 1452.!
(Trident)
Current Year Advance 306.5 306.5 306.5 306.5 306.5 306..'
TOTAL 1832.1 1759 1759 1759 1759 175<
PROCUREMENT 587.2 587.2 587.2 587.2 587.2 587.:
(Trident I)
R&D (Trident)
R&D (Trident H) 1496.4 1496.4 1496.4 1506.4 1506.4 1506.4
1985
PROCUREMENT 1489.5 1149.5 1127.1 1489.5 1460.3 1420.3
(Trident)
Prior Year Transfer (-) -340 -340 -41
Current Year Advance 265.5 265.5 265.5 265.5 265.5 269
TOTAL 1755 1415 1392.6 1755 1725.8 1685.8
PROCUREMENT 163.8 153.8 153.8 158.8 158.8 153.8
(Trident I)
133PROCUREMENT 138.5 128 128 138.5 138.5
(Trident 0)
Current Year Advance 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4 24.4
TOTAL 162.9 152.4 152.4 162.9 162.9 157.4
R&D (Trident I) 41.2 30 30 30 30 30
R&D (Trident II) 2091.1 2051.1 2051.1 2086.1 2086.1 2075.1
1986
PROCUREMENT 1283.6 1283.6 1283.6 1208.6 1183.6 1233.6
(Trident)
Current Year Advance 248.2 248.2 248.2 248.2 248.2 248.2
TOTAL 1531.8 1531.8 1531.8 1456.8 1431.8 1481.8
PROCUREMENT 66.2 56.2 56.2 46.2 36.2 36.2
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7
(Trident II)
Current Year Advance 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3
















































































































































FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE sasc SENATE
1989
PROCUREMENT 1230.7 1230.7 1230.7 1230.7 1230.7
(Trident)
Current Year Advance 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4
TOTAL 1368.1 1368.1 1368.1 1368.1 1368.1
PROCUREMENT 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5
(Trident II)
Current Year Advance 236.1 236.1 236.1 236.1 236.1
TOTAL 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6
R&D (Trident) 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5
R&D (Trident H) 580.9 580.9 580.9 580.9 580.9
1990
PROCUREMENT 1137.2 1137.2 1137.1 1137.2 1137.2
(Trident)
Current Year Advance 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4
TOTAL 1274.6 1274.6 1274.6 1274.6 1274.6
PROCUREMENT 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 1598.5 1598.5 1598.5 1699.5 1699.5
(Trident II)
Current Year Advance 216.1 216.1 216.1 216.1 216.1
TOTAL 1814.6 1814.6 1814.6 1915.6 1915.6
R&D (Trident) 38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4 38.4




HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO TRIDENT AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1972
(Leggett, D-CA) Delete $700 million of the $926.4 million requested for the Trident
submarine-missile program (Rejected Voice).82
II. 1973
(Leggett, D-CA) Cut Trident submarine funding by an additional $832 million from
the SASC's cut of $52.6 million (Rejected Overwhelmingly).83
III. 1974
(Leggett, D-CA) Slow pace of Trident submarine construction from two vessels a
year to one (Rejected Voice).84
IV. 1975
(Leggett, D-CA) Delete the $559.9 million authorized Trident submarine
construction (Rejected Voice).85
V. 1982
A. (Downey, D-NY) Cancel development of the Trident II missile; U.S.
should not build weapons that could threaten a surprise attack on Soviet command posts
and missile launchers (Rejected 89-3 12).86
82 1972 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 410.
83 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 891-2.
84 1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 576.
85 1975 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 369.
86 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 96.
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B . (HASC) Reduce Trident missile procurement by $699 million. The
remaining $1,542 billion would fund only one missile submarine in fiscal 1983 instead of
the two requested. (Adopted with little opposition). 87
VI. 1984
(Weiss, D-NY) Deny $152 million to begin setting up the production line for the
Trident II missile; should avoid missiles that could threaten a surprise attack on Soviet
missile launchers (Rejected 93-3 19). 88
VII. 1985
(Weiss, D-NY) Block production of the Trident II missile (Rejected 79-342).89
VIII. 1986
A . (Weiss, D-NY) Block production of the Trident II missile by using the
$1.43 billion in the bill for Trident II procurement to buy additional Trident I missiles
instead (Rejected 94-306).90
B . (Gejdenson, D-CN) Add $1.5 billion for a Trident missile submarine,
which likely would be built in his district (Rejected 188-21 1).91
IX. 1987
A . (Weiss, D-NY) Kill development and production of the Trident II missile
(Rejected 93-330).92
87 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 99.
88 1984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 43.
89 1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 157.
90 1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 481.
91 1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 481.
92 1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 236.
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B . (Feighan, D-OH) Bar installation of the Trident II in the eight missile
submarines already in service (Rejected 109-31 1).93
X. 1988
(Weiss, D-NY) Require the Navy to buy Trident I missiles instead of Trident II
missiles (Rejected 79-307).94
XI. 1989
(Weiss, D-NY) Permit continued deployment of the Trident II missile in new
Trident submarines while barring its deployment on the first nine Trident subs (Rejected
83-341).
93 1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 236.
94 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 410.
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APPENDIX C: B-l AUTHORIZATIONS
(in millions of dollars)
BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REQUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CQNFERQ
1971
R&D (B-l) 100 100 100 50 50
1972
R&D (B-l) 370.3 370.3 370.3 370.3 370.3 3;
1972
R&D (B-l) 444.5 444.5 444.5 444.5 444.5 44
1974
R&D (B-l) 473.5 473.5 473.5 373.5 373.5 M
1975
R&D (B-l) 499 499 499 455 455 I
197$
PROCUREMENT (B-l) 77 77 77
R&D (B-l) 672.2 672.2 672.2 597.2 597.2 1
197* TRANSITION
PROCUREMENT (B-l) 31 31 31
R&D (B-l) 168.3 168.3 168.3 129.3 129.3 1
1977
PROCUREMENT (B-l) 948 948 948 948 948 5
Current Year Advance 89 89 89 89 89
TOTAL 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 K
R&D (B-l) 482.7 482.7 482.7 482.7 482.7 48:
1978
PROCUREMENT (B-l) 1172.6 1172.6 1172.6 1172.6 1172.6 in:
Current Year Advance 138 138 138 138 138 l
TOTAL 1310.6 1310.6 1310.6 1310.6 1310.6 1311
R&D(B-1B) 442.5 442.5 442.5 442.5 442.5 442
1979
R&D (B-1B) 105.5 105.5 105.5
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BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
1980
R&D (B- IB) 54.9 54.9 54.9 30 30 54.9
1981
PROCUREMENT (SWL) 200 200
PROCUREMENT (ATSB) 91 91 75
PROCUREMENT (NSA)
TOTAL 200 200 91 91 91
R&D (SWL) 400 400 300
R&D(B-1) 30.7 30.7 30.7
1?82
PROCUREMENT (LRCA) 1632 1632 1632 1632 1632 1574
Current Year Advance 310 310 310 310 310 227
TOTAL 1942 1942 1942 1942 1942 1801
R&D (LRCA) 302 302 302 302 302 302
1983
PROCUREMENT (B-1B) 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1
Current Year Advance 475 475 475 475 475 475
TOTAL 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1
R&D (B-1B) 753.5 753.5 753.5 753.5 753.5 753.5
1984
PROCUREMENT (B-1B) 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8
Current Year Advance 1865 1865 1865 1865 1865 1865
TOTAL 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8
R&D (B-1B) 749.9 749.9 749.9 749.9 749.9 749.9
1985
PROCUREMENT (B-1B) 5558.2 5558.2 5558.2 5558.2 5558.2 5558.2
Current Year Advance 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4
TOTAL 7102.6 7102.6 7102.6 7102.6 7102.6 7102.6
R&D(B-1B) 508.3 400 400 508.3 508.3 465
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BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERE
1986
PROCUREMENT (B-1B) 5461.8 5461.8 5461.8 5461.8 5461.8 *
R&D (B- IB) 367.4 200.4 200.4 367.4 367.4 1
1987
PROCUREMENT 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4
(Modify B- IB)
R&D (B- IB) 118.7 50 50 118.7 118.7
1988
PROCUREMENT 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
(Modify B-1B)
R&D(B-1B) 415.5 375.7 375.7 375.7 375.7
-
1989






221.6 221.6 221.6 1
1990
PROCUREMENT 10 10 10 10 10
(B-1B)




HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO B-l AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1970
(Nedzi, D-MI) Strike the $100 million requested for B-l development. Hebert
argued that if funds were cut off the $140 million already spent on B-l research would be
wasted and that a new bomber was needed (Rejected teller vote 51-91).^
II. 1972
(Pike, D-NY) Delete entire $444.5 million authorization for the B-l research and
development. Nixon emphasized the program was a necessary option for the United States
due to the restriction placed on missiles by the SALT agreement (Rejected 94-279).96
III. 1973
(Pike, D-NY) Delete $473 million for research and development of the B-l so as to
kill the program (Rejected 96-313) 97
IV. 1974
(Pike, D-NY) Delete the $499 million for B-l development. Price (D-IL), Armed
Services Subcommittee chairman on Research and Development agreed with Pike that the
B-l had been "a sick program", but that killing it was not the solution (Rejected 94-309)98
95 1970 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 389.
961972 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 209, 210.
97 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 892.
98 1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 576-7.
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V. 1975
(Aspin, D-WI) Eliminate $108 million for procurement of "long lead-time items"
needed to produce the B-l; cited lack of need for procurement money now since Congress
had yet to make a final decision on building the B-l (Rejected 164-227).^
VI. 1976
(Seiberling, D-OH) Delay until after 1 February 1977 expenditure of $960.5 million
recommended in the bill by the Armed Services Committee for purchase of the first three B-
1 bombers (Rejected 177-210). 100
VII. 1980
(Edwards, R-ALA) Cut $200 million from the $600 million added in committee for
the strategic weapons launcher (SWL), a modified version of the B-l (Rejected 119-
297). 101
VIII. 1981
A . (Fowler, D-GA) Remove an Armed Services Committee provision that
favored the B-l. The committee bill provided that $1.9 million would be available only to
begin production of the B-l, unless Reagan certified the stealth plane was needed instead
and Congress agreed by concurrent resolution within 60 days (Rejected 153-254). 102
B. (Harkin, D-IA) Would allow the president to kill the B-l if Congress did
not disapprove his decision by concurrent resolution within 60 days (Rejected Voice).""
9^1975 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 368.
100 1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 282.
101 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 55.
102 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 197, 222.
103 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 222.
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IX. 1982
(Dellums, D-CA) Delete the $4.03 billion requested to procure seven B-ls plus
spare parts and components for other planes to be ordered later (Rejected 142-257).*™
X. 1983
A . (Dellums, D-CA) Delete the $6.2 billion earmarked for procurement of 10
B-lBs and components for future B-lBs (Rejected 164-255). 105
B . (McCloskey, D-IN) bar negotiation of a multi-year contract covering several
years of the scheduled B-l production run (Rejected 171-252). 106
1041982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 99.
105 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 179.
106 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 179.
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APPENDIX E: MX AUTHORIZATIONS


















R&D (MX) 15.3 15.3 15.3 14.3 14.3 14
1?77
R&D (MX) 84 80 80 51.6 51.6
1978
R&D (MX) 134.4 134.4 134.4 134.4 134.4 134
1979






















R&D (MX) 670 670 670 670 670 6"
1981
R&D (MX) 1564.9 1564.9 1564.9 1564.9 1564.9 1564
1981 SUPPLEMENTAL
R&D (MX) 5 5 5
1982














FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
1?§4
PROCUREMENT (MX) 2460 2460 2102.2 2536 2438 2101.2
R&D (MX, original request) 3378.4
R&D (MX, revised request) 2034 1980.4 1980.4 2034.4 2034.4 2034.4
R&D (Follow on Tech) 604 270 270 604 604 604
(SILO HARDENING) 210 20 20 210 210 210
(HARD MOB) 75 75 75 75
(SICBM) 279 250 250 279 279 279
(DEEP BASING) 40 40 40 40
1985
PROCUREMENT (MX) 2938.9 2488.9 1813.9 2388.9 2388.9 2352
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2440.8 2340.8 2340.8 2363.5 2363.5 2345
(MX) 1716.3 1716.3 1716.3 1716.3
(SICBM) 465.2 404.8 404.8
(SILO HARDENING) 219.7 219.7 219.7
(DEEP BASING) 39.6
1986
PROCUREMENT (MX) 3037.3 2037.3 921 2056.3 1746.3 1746
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 1580.8 1308.6 1458.6 1530.8 1530.8 1548.6
(MX) 784.1 684.1 684.1 784.1 784.1 734.1
(SICBM) 624.5 624.5 774.5 624.5 624.5 724.5
(FOL ON BASING) 172.2 122.2 122.2 90
1987
PROCUREMENT (MX) 1418.2 1114.7 1114.7 1418.1 1418.1 1114.7
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2116.8 1575.5 1575.5 1198.8 1198.8 1610
(MX) 352.3 200 200 322.3 322.3 290
(SICBM) 1375.5 1375.5 1375.5 675.5 675.5 1200
(BASING) 389 201 201 120
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BUDGET
FISCAL TOAR KEQUESI HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERI
1988
PROCUREMENT (MX) 1259.9 864 864 864 864
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2875.7 1866.2 1866.2 431.2 431.2
(MX) 51.2 41.2 41.2 31.2 31.2
(SICBM) 2233.2 1575 1575
(BASING) 591.4 250 250 400 400
1989
PROCUREMENT (MX) 807 807 807 807 807
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 1032.9 1032.9 732.9 790 790
(MX) 40 32.9 32.9 40 40
(SICBM) 200 500 600 50 50
(BASING) 792.9 500 100 700 700
Unallocated
1990
PROCUREMENT (MX) 691 691 691 691 691
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 1200 1200 614.8 889 889
(MX) 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8
(SICBM) 100 100 100 100
(BASING) 1085.2 1085.2 600 774.2 774.2
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APPENDIX F
HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO MX AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1977
(Dellums, D-CA) Kill the new, mobile ICBM program (MX) (Rejected 1 1-87). 107
II. 1979
A . (Dellums, D-CA) Delete $670 million to continue MX development; SSBNs
and bombers cited as sufficient to deter (Rejected 86-305). 108
B . (Santini, D-NV) Allow not more than 25% ofMX launch sites to be located
in any one state (Rejected 84-289). 109
III. 1979 Supplemental
A . (Bedell, D-IA) would have reversed the bill's strong presumption in favor
of the MPS basing mode for the MX (Rejected 100-291). 110
B . (Dellums, D-CA) ban all further development of an MX missile system,
including a launching mode (Rejected 89-31 1). 111
C . (Ichord, D-MO) delete $75 million for development of the airborne version
of the MX. A majority of the House Armed Services favored the MPS version and further
study of the airborne version would delay deployment of the MX (Adopted Voice). 112
107 1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 336.
108 1979 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 450.
109i979 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 451.





A . (Simon, D-IL) Cut $500 million of MX authorization intended for initial
development of a basing system. Pro: With SALT II by the wayside, Soviets could build
enough to counter MX and environmental delays would afford Soviets time to build
counter; Kemp opposed, arguing MX needed since Soviet missile accuracy by 1982
sufficient to destroy existing silo-based ICBMs (Rejected 152-250). 113
B . (Dellums, D-CA) Eliminate all MX funds (Rejected 82-319). 114
C . (Marriott, R-UT) Bar release of public lands for MX until Secretary of Defense had:
(1) completed report on local impact, (2) specified amount of public land to be restricted
from public use, (3) proposed methods of easing the impact of areas affected, and (4)
studied feasibility of basing MX in states other than Nevada or Utah (Rejected 135-
268). 115
V. 1981
A . (Dellums, D-CA) Kill the MX (Rejected 39-316). 116
B . (Hansen, R-UT) Give Congress 60 days to block president's decision on
basing the MX, once it is announced (Adopted Voice). 117
C. (Simon, D-Ill) Require concurrence by both houses on the president's
decision (Rejected 201-207). 118
113 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 55.
114Ibid.
115 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 55-6.




D . (HASC) Give Congress 60 days to block by concurrent resolution the
president's plan for basing the MX, and bar use of funds for an MX basing system other
than the Carter-approved MPS plan (Adopted Voice). 119
VI. 1982
A. (Mavroules, D-MA; Byron, D-MD) Delete $1.14 billion earmarked for
purchase of first 9 production-line versions of MX (Rejected; Stratton substitute
amendment passed). 120
B . (Stratton, D-NY) Bar expenditure of $259.9 million earmarked for basing
until 30 days after the president reported to Congress his chosen basing method (Adopted
212-209). 121
C . (Simon, D-Ill) Delete amount earmarked for development of a way to base
first 40 MXs in existing Minuteman silos (Rejected, substitute amendment by Stratton
passed). 122
D . (Stratton, D-NY) Money could not be spent until 30 legislative days after
Congress notified of the President's choice of a permanent, survivable basing method for
MX (Adopted Voice). 123
E
. (Emery, R-ME) Bar any research on the "deep underground" basing method
for MX (Rejected 56-140). 124
119Ibid.
120 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 97.
121Ibid.





A. (Bennett, D-FL; Mavroules, D-MA) Delete $2.6 billion earmarked for
production of first 27 production-line models of MX; opponents stressed necessity of MX
to induce Russians to negotiate seriously (Rejected 207-220). 125
B . (Price; Aspin, D-WI) Req ~e future MX production and deployment not be
allowed to outrun the development of a small, single-warhead missile (Adopted Voice). 126
C . (Gore, D-TN; Dicks, D-WA) Reduce number of MXs authorized from 27 to
21, a decrease of $385 million (Adopted Voice). 127
VIII. 1984
A . (Mavroules, D-MA) Block production of any MXs in FY85 (Rejected 212-
218). 128
B . (Dickinson, R-AL; led by Aspin) Buy 15 missiles for $1.8 billion: (1) no
money spent until 1 April 1985, and (2) only if, in the President's judgement, Soviets were
not indicating a willingness to bargain in good faith for limits on ICBMs such as MX
(Adopted 229-199). 129
C . (Bennett, D-FL) Congress, by joint resolution, and not the President,
would have last say on whether to proceed with 15 missiles after 1 April 1985 ; (Adopted
199-196; there were three separate votes all won by three votes or less). 130
125 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 180.
126 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 181.
127Ibid.






A . (Mavroules, D-MA; McCurdy) Impose permanent limit of 40 on number of
MXs to be deployed; allow no additional production of MXs in FY86 (Adopted Voice ). 131
B . (Dickinson, R-AL) Approve production of an additional 12 missiles in
FY86 and set cap at 50 missiles deployed (pause) (No Vote, McCurdy amended it). 132
C . (Bennett, D-FL) Deny MX procurement money in FY86 and direct unspent
MX money from earlier years to be used for conventional weapons (Rejected 1 85-230). 133
D . (McCurdy, D-Ok) Amended Dickinson's amendment to fall in line with
Mavroules (Adopted 233-1 84). 134
E . (Courter, R-NJ) Offered substitute amendment for Mavroules, restating
Dickinson's amendment (Rejected 1 83-234). 135
X. 1986
A. (Bennett, D-FL) Delete MX production funds, giving $250 million to
conventional weapons programs (Rejected 178-218). 136
B . (Bennett, D-FL) Delete MX production funds, giving $550 million to
conventional weapons programs (Rejected 179-217). 137









A . (Hertel, D-MI) Delete all requested funds ($250 million) to develop a rail-
mobile launcher for the MX (Rejected 184-259). 138
B . (Frank, D-MA) End MX production (Rejected 1 63-258). 139
XII. 1988
A . (Hertel, D-MI) Deny all funds for rail-MX (Rejected 1 43-265). 140
B . (Dickinson, R-AL) Proposed $650 million for MX and $350 million for
Midgetman (Rejected 156-247). 141
C . (Aucoin, D-OR; Mavroules, D-MA) Cut rail-MX to $100 million, boost
Midgetman to $600 million (Adopted 233- 177). 142
XIII. 1989
A . (Hertel, D-MI) kill rial-mobile MX (Rejected 1 68-253). 143
B . (Dellums, D-CA) End both mobile ICBM programs (Rejected Voice). 144
C . (Spratt, D-SC) Cut MX funding in half (Adopted 224- 197). 145
D . (Mavroules, D-MA) limit MXs to be deployed to 50 (Adopted 259- 160). 146
138 1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 236.
139lbid.
140 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 410.
141 Ibid.
142Ibid.





APPENDIX G: TRIDENT APPROPRIATIONS
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R&D (Trident) 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6 125.6























R&D (Trident) 107.2 107.2 107.2 107.2 107.2 107.2
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274.8 274.8 274.8 55 55
1186.7 274.8 274.8 55 55
723.4 723.4 723.4 723.4 723.4
166.4 166.4 166.4 166.4 166.4
889.8 889.8 889.8 889.8 889.8
73.8 73.8 73.8 73.8 73.8
191.8 191.8 191.8 200 200




















1106.9 1106.6 1106.6 1106.6 1106.6
14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2
1121.1 1120.8 1120.8 1120.8 1120.8
676.6 676.5 676.5 676.5 676.5
86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5 86.5
763 763 763 763 763
124.2 124.2 124.2 124.2 124.2











REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE
1050.2 1050.2 1050.2 1050.2 1050.2
40 38 38 40 40
1090.2 1088.2 1088.2 1090.2 1090.2
696.9 696.9 696.9 696.9 696.9
172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7 172.7
869.6 869.6 869.6 869.6 869.6
80 80 80 80 80


































330.7 230.7 230.7 330.7 330.7
330.7 230.7 230.7 330.7 330.7
665.1 665.1 665.1 665.1 665.1
244.8 244.8 244.8 244.8 244.8
909.9 909.9 909.9 909.9 909.9
102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8
240 240 240 240 240
243.9 81.3 81.3 81.3 81.3
2485 1509.9 1509.9 1543.9 1543.9
699.5 685.3 685.3 633.7 633.7
43.3 36.3 36.3 36.3 36.3
742.8 721.6 721.6 670 670
90.6 64 64 74 74
366.7 366.7 366.7 366.7 366.7
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BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HA$C HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
1W
PROCUREMENT 1525.6 1398.4 1398.4 1402.5 1402.5 1398.4
(Trident)
Current Year Adv 306.5 306.5 306.5 306.5 306.5 306.5
TOTAL 1832.1 1704.9 1704.9 1709 1709 1704.9
PROCUREMENT 587.2 523.4 523.4 587.2 587.2 555.3
(Trident I)
R&D (Trident) 72.4 72.4 72.4 72.4 72.4 72.4
R&D (Trident H) 1496.4 1496.4 1496.4 1496.4 1506.4 1501.4
1985
PROCUREMENT 1489.5 1489.5 1489.5 1482.7 1482.7 1482.7
(Trident)
Current Year Adv 265.5 265.5 265.5 265.5 265.5 265.5
TOTAL 1755 1755 1755 1748.2 1748.2 1748.2
PROCUREMENT 163.8 153.8 153.8 158.8 158.8 153.8
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 138.5 138.5 138.5 138.5 138.5 138.5
(Trident II)
Current Year Adv 24.4 9.8 9.8 24.4 24.4 24.4
TOTAL 163.2 148.3 148.3 163.2 163.2 163.2
R&D (Trident) 41.2 30 30 30 30 30
R&D (Trident II) 2091.1 2051.1 2051.1 2075.1 2075.1 2063.1
1?8G
PROCUREMENT 1283.6 816.7 816.7 1196.6 1196.6 1196.6
(Trident)
Prior Year Transfer (-) 373.9 373.9
Current Year Adv 248.2 248.2 248.2 158.1 158.1 158.1
TOTAL 1531.8 1064.9 1064.9 1354.7 1354.7 1354.7
PROCUREMENT 66.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7 312.7
(Trident U)
Current Year Adv) 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3 269.3
TOTAL 582 582 582 582 582 582
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BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERE)
R&D (Trident) 47.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2
R&D (Trident H) 2165.5 2103.6 2103.6 2130.6 2130.6 21
1987
PROCUREMENT 1362.7 1362.7 1362.7 1300 1300
(Trident)
Current Year Adv 146.4 146.4 146.4 146.4 146.4 1
TOTAL 1509.1 1509.1 1509.1 1446.4 1446.4 14
PROCUREMENT 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 1124.4 1124.4 1124.4 1086.6 1086.6 10
(Trident II)
Current Year Adv 300 300 300 275.8 275.8 2
TOTAL 1424.4 1424.4 1424.4 1362.4 1362.4 13
R&D (Trident) 51.8 41 41 51.8 51.8
R&D (Trident II) 1632.9 1500 1500 1595 1595
1988
PROCUREMENT 1193.7 1193.7 1193.7 1123.7 1153.7 11;
(Trident)
Current Year Adv 137.1 137.1 137.1 137.1 137.1 i:
TOTAL 1330.8 1330.8 1330.8 1330.8 1290.8 12"
PROCUREMENT 7 7 7 7 7
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 1931.3 1462.3 1462.3 1931.3 1931.3 n:
(Trident H)
Current Year Advance 320 320 320 320 320
TOTAL 2251.3 1782.3 1782.3 2251.3 2251.3 2ft
R&D (Trident) 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 ',
R&D (Trident H) 1098.5 1000 1000 1098.5 1098.5 10!
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BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFERENCE
1989
PROCUREMENT 1230.7 1123.7 1123.7 1123.7 1123.7 1123.7
(Trident)
Current Year Adv 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4 137.4
TOTAL 1368.1 1261.1 1261.1 1261.1 1261.1 1261.1
PROCUREMENT 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
(Trident I)
PROCUREMENT 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5 1629.5
(Trident II)
Current Year Adv 236.1 236.1 236.1 236.1 236.1 236.1
TOTAL 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6 1865.6
R&D (Trident) 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5
R&D (Trident II) 580.9 560.9 560.9 580.9 580.9 575
1990
PROCUREMENT 1137.2 1137.2 1137.2 1037.2 1037.2 1032.2
(TRIDENT)
Prior Year Transfer (-) 100 100 100
Current Year Advance 140.6 140.6 140.6 100.6 100.6 100.6
TOTAL 1277.8 1277.8 1277.8 1137.8 1137.8 1132.8
PROCUREMENT 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
(TRIDENT I)
PROCUREMENT 1598.5 1598.5 1598.5 1233.5
(TRIDENT II)
Current Year Advance 216.1 216.1 216.1 216.1
TOTAL 1814.6 1814.6 1814.6 1449.6
R&D (Trident) 38.4 33.5 33.5 38.4 38.4 33.5
R&D (Trident H) 216.1 205.3 205.3 286.1 286.1 202.3
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APPENDIX H
HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO TRIDENT APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1976
A . (Addabbo, D-NY) Deleted all funds for immediate missile procurement and
added $220 million for long lead-time procurement, an overall reduction of $688 million;
similar amendment by Addabbo defeated in committee on a 10-30 vote (Accepted Robinson
amendment). 147
B . (Robinson, R-VA) Conceding that it would be necessary to delay the start
of procurement, and at the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, proposed a
procurement funding cut of only $165 million (Adopted Voice). 148
C . (Robinson, R-VA) Add $50 million to Trident's research and development
account, also suggested by Rumsfeld (Adopted Voice). 149





HISTORY OF HAC ACTION CONCERNING THE TRIDENT PROGRAM
I. FISCAL 1973
HAC recommended a reduction of $50 million in Trident procurement funds and a
deletion of the $ 10 million requested to begin procurement of the Trident I missile. Neither
action was policy oriented as the $10 million was appropriated in the Military Construction
Budget while the $50 million reduction was recommended since only a relatively small
percentage of the requested funds could have been expended in this fiscal year.
II. FISCAL 1974
The HAC recommended a $240 million reduction in Trident advance procurement
funds from the bueget request of $28 1 million, authorized earilier by the House and in
conference. This was policy oriented as it reflected the committee's opinion that the Trident
program should be decelerated to bring it in line with the program originally presented to
Congress in fiscal 1973.
III. FISCAL 1976
The HAC recommended a $35 million reduction from the House's and conference's
authorized level of $235.7 million for Trident I missile procurement. This was due to
problems with motor testings and the conclusion that budgeting large sums of money now
would be premature; thus, it was not a policy issue, as Armed Services Committee support
was emphasized in its report.
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IV. FISCAL 1978
The HAC recommended reductions in the procurement accounts for the the Trident
submarine and Trident I missile. In the case of the Trident I missile, the reduction of $30
million would be made up with a prior year excess of $30 million, as disclosed in budget
review. As for the sub, the reductions would be made up by transferal of prior excess
funds from the terminated PHM program. Thus, the HAC actually recommended full
funding, but by using prior year excess funds.
V. FISCAL 1980
The HAC recommended $40.6 million for Trident II missile R&D, the amount
requested, while the House had authorized zero and the conference had authorized $25.6
million.
VI. FISCAL 1981
HAC made a symbolic $2 million reduction in Trident advance procurement funds
to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the Pentagon's use of this funding method.
VII. FISCAL 1982
The HAC recommended a $100 million reduction in Trident advance procurement,




In five cases the HAC recommended appropriations different from both the House
and conference authorized amount. For Trident I missile procurement and advance
procurement, these reductions would be compensated by using management reserves, such
that each account would still receive full funding. For Trident I R&D, the HAC level was
at the suggestion of the administration while the authorizing legislation was still being
considered by Congress. Finally, the appropriation level for Trident procurement was
consistent with the conference agreement to build only one sub while the significant
decrease in Trident advance procurement was a committee observation that advance
procurement funds were still available from fiscal 1982 since no boat was built that year.
Thus, in all five cases, the issues were strictly monetary.
IX. FISCAL 1984
The HAC reduction in Trident procurement a monetary decision, as it felt the
Navy's estimate of a 17 percent increase in recurring costs was excessive. The reduction in
Trident I missile procurement followed the Defense Department revising its costs
downward after the authorization process. Again, neither case reflected a policy concern.
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X. FISCAL 1985
The HAC recommendation for Trident procurement differed for accounting reasons
as both the House and conference authorizations utilized prior year funds, while the
appropriation recommendation did not. The HAC decision to appropriate $138.5 million
for Trident II procurement matched the budget request but was higher than the House
authorized amount of $128 million and the conference compromise of $133 million. It is
interesting that in the authorization process the House was able to get the Senate lower its
funding from $138.5 million to $133 million, and then have the HAC recommend the full
amount in the appropriation process, which incidentally was approved by the House. The
HAC reduction from $24.4 to $9.8 million in Trident II advance procurement reflected a
concern that the request for an accelerometer was premature. Thus, in this year it appears
that the HAC made appropriation recommendations out of policy concerns, although the
direction was unclear as an increase was recommended for Trident II procurement and a




The HAC recommendation reduced Trident procurement by $466.9 million.
$373.9 million would be made up by prior year funds. This is classified as a monetary
issue as the committee report cited favorable prior year contract negotiations, a lower
inflation rate, and a reprogramming action as rationale for the reduction. The Trident II
R&D recommendation difference was insignificant.
XII. FISCAL 1987
The HAC recommendation simply coincided with the budget request, while the
House deleted funding for the Trident in the authorization process and the conference
agreement ended up including a slight reduction.
XIII. FISCAL 1988
The HAC reductions for both Trident II procurement and R&D accounts were due
to fiscal constraints.
XIV. FISCAL 1989
The HAC recommended a $20 million reduction to $560.9 million for Trident II
R&D, citing that this program had a history of being able to sustain small cuts in funding.
XV. FISCAL 1990
The five percent reduction in Trident II R&D made by the HAC was due to testing
delays.
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APPENDIX J: B-l APPROPRIATIONS








































1172.6 1172.6 1172.6 1172.6
138 138 138 138
1310.6 1310.6 1310.6 1310.6
75
370.3 370.3 370.3 370.3 370.3
444.5 444.5 444.5 444.5 444.5
473.5 448.5 448.5 448.5 448.5
400
77 64 64
672.2 642.2 642.2 597.2 597.2
31 23 23
168.3 158 158 129 129
948 948 948 948 948
89 89 89 89 89
1037 1037 1037 1037 1037


























































175 175 300 300
31
1674 1574 1574 1724.2 1724.2
227 227 227 233.8 233.8
1901 1801 1801 1958 1958
471
3393.1 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1 3393.1
475 475 475 475 475
3868.1 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1 3868.1
753.5
3761.8 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8 3761.8
1865 1865 1865 1865 1865
5626.8 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8 5626.8
749.9
5558.2 5127 5127 5558.2 5558.2
196.2 196.2
1544.4 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4 1544.4
7102.6 6671.4 6671.4 7102.6 7102.6





















FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SASC SENATE CONFEREN
19SG
PROCUREMENT (B-1B) 5461.8 4861.8 5161.8 5261.8 5261.8 5ie
Prior Year Transfer (-) 300 300
R&D (B-1B) 367.4 280.4 280.4 280.4 280.4 28
1??7
PROCUREMENT 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4 96.4
(Modify B- IB)
R&D(B-1B) 118.7 50 50 118.7 118.7 11
1988
PROCUREMENT 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
(Modify B-1B)
R&D(B-1B) 415.5 375.7 375.7 375.7 375.7 37
1989
PROCUREMENT 26.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 2
(Modify B- IB)









HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO B-l APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1976
(Addabbo, D-NY) Defer until 1 February 1977 expenditures of $948 million for
procurement of the first three regular-production B-l bombers; similar amendment offered
by Addabbo rejected in committee on a 15-26 vote (Rejected 1 86-207). 15°
II. 1977
A. (Addabbo, D-NY, June 28) Remove the production money for the B-l,
$1.4 billion. On June 30, President Carter announced his decision to cancel the B-l and
the Senate voted to delete the $1.4 billion. Due to the large difference between the House
and Senate positions, the issue was sent back to both chambers and on Sept 8 the House
voted on Addabbo's amendment (Rejected 178-243). 151
B . (Addabbo, D-NY, Sept 8) Delete B-l procurement funds (Adopted 202-
199). 152
III. 1981
A . (Addabbo, D-NY) Remove $1.8 billion in procurement money for the B-l,
citing that it would not long be able to penetrate Soviet air defense and that it would drain
development of a "stealth" bomber (Rejected 142-263). 153
1501976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 765, 770.
151 1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 267.
152 1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 264, 276.
153 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 317.
137
B . (Murtha, D-PA) This substitute amendment to Addabbo's was similar but
designed as part of a strategy to modernize and enlarge the F-l 1 1 fighters already in service
as an alternative to producing B-ls (Rejected 99-307). 154
IV. 1982
(Addabbo, D-NY; Dec 8) Delete $4 billion to buy the first seven B-ls and
components for future planes (Rejected Voice). 155
V. 1983
(Addabbo, D-NY) Delete $438.7 million to begin multi-year procurement of B-l
bombers; this would have cut funds to buy components for B-ls scheduled for
procurement in the fiscal 1986 budget and after (Rejected 1 75-247). 156
154Ibid.
155 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 286.
156 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 485.
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APPENDIX L: MX APPROPRIATIONS


















R&D (MX) 41.2 38 38 40.1 40.1 38
1976 TRANSITION
R&D (MX) 15.3 12.9 12.9 14.3 14.3 12.9
1977
R&D (MX) 84 84 84 69 69 69
J?7§
R&D (MX) 134.4 134.4 134.4 134.4 134.4 134.4
J?7?
R&D (MX) 158.2 158.2 158.2 158.2 158.2 158.2
1980
R&D (MX) 670 670 670 670 670 670
1981


























FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE sasc SENATE CONFERE
1984
PROCUREMENT (MX) 2438 2102.2 2102.2 2102.2 2102.2 2
R&D (MX) 2034.4 2034.4 2034.4 2034.4 2034.4 2(
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 604 354 354 584 584
(SILO HARDENING) 210 210 210
(HARD MOBILE) 75 75 75 75 75
(SMALL MOBILE) 279 279 279 279 279
(DEEP BASING) 40 20 20
1985
PROCUREMENT (MX) 2938.9 1580.9 1580.9 2352.2 2352.2
PRIOR YEAR
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2440.8 2340.8 2340.8 2345 2345 22
(MX) 1716.3 1716.3 1716.3 1716.3 1716.3 1/
(SMALL MOBILE) 465.2 404.9 404.9 465.2 465.2 4
(SILO HARDENING) 219.7 219.7 219.7 219.7 219.7 2
(DEEP BASING) 39.6 9.6 9.6
(GENERAL RED) -18.5
i?8fi
PROCUREMENT (MX) 3037.3 1746 1746 1746 1746
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 1580.8 1483.6 1483.6 1274.8 1274.8 14
(MX) 784.1 784.1
(SMALL MOBILE) 624.5 724.5 724.5 368.5
(Prior Year Transfer to 256 256
SICBM)
(SILO HARDENING) 152.2 102.2
(DEEP BASING) 20 20
1987
PROCUREMENT (MX) 1418.1 1114.7 1114.7 1368.1 1368.1 11
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2116.8 1575.5 1575.5 1116.8 1116.8 1
(MX) 352.3 200 200 321.3 321.3
(SICBM) 1375.5 1375.5 1375.5 675.5 675.5 1
(ALTERNATE BASING) 389 120 120
140
BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR REOUEST HASC HOUSE SA$C SENATE CONFERENCE
1988
PROCUREMENT (MX) 1259.9 864 864 864 864 864
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 2875.7 1866.2 1866.2 431.2 431.2 1086
(MX) 51.2 41.2 41.2 31.2 31.2 36
(SICBM) 2233.2 1575 1575 700
(RAIL MOBILE) 591.4 250 250 400 400 350
HM
PROCUREMENT (MX) 807 807 807 732 732 807
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 1032.9 732.9 732.9 790 790 890
(MX) 40 32.9 32.9 40 40 40
(SICBM) 200 600 600 50 50 250
(RAIL MOBILE) 792.9 100 100 686.9 686.9 600
Unallocated 13.1 13.1
1??0
PROCUREMENT (MX) 771 691 691 661 661 691
PROCUREMENT (MK 21 80 80
Warhead)
Current Year Advance 163.6 163.6 163.6 163.6
TOTAL 934.6 691 691 904.6 904.6 854.6
R&D (ICBM Modernization) 889 614.8 614.8 889 889 889
(MX) 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8
(SICBM) 100 100 100 100
(RAIL MOBILE) 774.2 600 600 774.2 774.2 774.2
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APPENDIX M
HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO MX APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1980
(Simon, D-Ill) Bar use of any funds to begin work on a plan for basing and
concealing the MX missile (Rejected 141-256). 157
II. 1981
A . (Murtha, D-PA) Restore $1.9 billion for development of the MX missile in
the appropriation's committee recommendation; the Defense Subcommittee voted on
October 28 to cancel the MX missile by a one-vote margin (Adopted 25-23 in the full
committee on November 16). 158
B . (Addabbo, D-NY) Continued work on the MX missile should await final
selection of a basing mode, but opponents stressed the bargaining-chip argument (Rejected
139-264). 159
III. 1982
A. (Addabbo, D-NY; Dec 7) Delete $988 million to buy the first five
production-line versions of the MX missile; similar proposal by Defense Subcommittee
defeated in Committee 26-26. This major symbolic defeat for Reagan marked the first time
that either house had rejected a strategic weapons program (Adopted 245- 176). 160
157 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 190-1.
158 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 313.
159Ibid., 317.
160 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 286.
142
B . (Edwards, R-Ala; Dec 8) Extended from March 15 to April 30 a committee-
imposed ban on expenditure of $560 million of the amount earmarked for developing an
MX basing system. Addabbo abandoned a fight to cut another $1.5 billion from the $2.5
billion budgeted to continue development of the MX by accepting this substitute
amendment (Adopted). 161
IV. 1983
(Addabbo, D-NY; Nov 1) Bar initial production of the MX missile by deleting the
entire $2.2 billion earmarked to purchase the first 21 missiles; on May 24 the House had
approved the start of MX flight tests by 53 votes but by July 20, the House rejected by
only 13 votes an amendment to the defense authorization bill that would have denied the
MX production funds. The decreasing vote margin reflected the power of the
congressional moderates who were bargaining the MX for a more flexible arms control
policy (Rejected, 208-217). 162
V. 1985
A. (Frank, D-MA; Oct 30) Drop $1.7 billion earmarked to buy 12 MXs in
fiscal 1986 (Adopted 21 1-208). 163
B . (Chappell, D-FL; Oct 30) Overturn Frank amendment; gave the White
House and MX backers time to round up votes (Rejected Frank Amendment 2 10-214). 164
161 Ibid.
1621983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 203-5, 484.
163 1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 385.
164Ibid. MX supporters believed that the first outcome was result of a small number of farm-state
Republicans who wanted to signal to the White House their frustration with administration farm policy.
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APPENDIX N
SENATE AMENDMENTS TO TRIDENT AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1972
(Bentsen, D-TX; Jul 27) Delete $508.4 million from the $906.4 million requested
for the Trident missile-firing submarine program. The $508.4 million was the amount
added to the original request by the administration to accelerate the Trident program; the
Armed Services Ad Hoc Research and Development Subcommittee, of which Bentsen was
a member, voted to delete the money but the full committee turned down the subcommittee
recommendation by an 8-8 tie vote (Rejected 39-47). 165
II. 1973
(Mclntyre, D-NH) Reduce Trident funding by $885 million to force the Navy to
return to its original procurement schedule—would delay launching of the first Trident by
two years. The vote followed over two days of intensive debate which Symington called
the most intensive lobbying effort during his 28 years on Capitol Hill (Rejected 47-49). 166
III. 1974
(Stennis) Delete $24.8 million from the bill because the same amount was provided
in the fiscal 1974 defense supplemental authorization (Adopted Voice). 167
I65J972 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 414.
166 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 896.
167 1974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 584.
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APPENDIX O
SENATE AMENDMENTS TO B-l AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1973
(Hughes, D-IA) Authorize $5 million for a study of alternatives to production of the
cosdy new B-l; opposed by Symington (Rejected 25-59). 168
II. 1974
(McGovern, D-SD) reduce by $255 million the $455 million in the bill for
development of the B-l (Rejected 31-59). 169
III. 1975
(McGovern, D-SD) Eliminate $840.5 million in fiscal 1976 and the transition
period for continued development (Rejected 32-57). 17°
IV. 1976
A . (Culver) Defer until 1 February 1977 a decision on procurement of the B-l
bomber. This amendment differed from the House version in that funds could be obligated
after Feb. 1 upon Presidential approval, vice congressional approval of a presidential
decision. This amendment had been rejected by the Armed Services Committee on a 6-9
vote; a similar amendment offered in committee to bar procurement of the first three aircraft
was defeated 3-10 (Adopted 44-37). 171
168 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 896.
169j974 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 584.
170 1975 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 374.
171 1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 286, 289-290.
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B . (McGovern, D-SD) This substitute version of the Culver amendment would
eliminate procurement funds for the B-l (Rejected 33-48). 172
V. 1980
A. (Glenn, D-OH) Allow Pentagon to use the $91 million to design and
develop any aircraft capable of penetrating enemy air defense as well as being able to carry
cruise missiles; bitterly opposed by Tower—Glenn accepted Tower's fourth amendment. 173
B . (Tower, D-TX) Add a deadline to choose between the FB-1 1 1B/C or B-l
since the administration's advanced-technology plane was in its earliest stages (Tabled 52-
38, 53-37, 54-36). Glenn accepted a fourth amendment which made the deadline 1987, the
year the Pentagon wanted to get the advanced bomber into the air anyway. 174
VI. 1983
A . (Kennedy, D-MA) Delete the $6.9 billion earmarked for procurement of 10
bombers and further development of the plane (Rejected 30-68). 175
B . (Nunn, D-GA) Bar a multi-year contract to cover the 10 B-ls authorized in
fiscal 1984, the 34 planned for fiscal 1985 and the 48 planned for fiscal 1986. This would
reduce the B-l account by $888.7 million, to be reallocated to conventional weapons, and




173 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 61-2.
174Ibid.




A . (Byrd, D-WV) None of the funds for the stealth bomber could be used for
any other purpose and funds could be used for any purpose related to the deployment of
more than 100 B- Is. This was to ensure no more than 100 B- Is would be built and that
development of the stealth bomber would not be delayed (Adopted Voice). 177
B . (Glenn, D-OH) Amend Byrd's amendment that would bar the assembly of a
101st B-l but would hold open the possibility of building more B-l components (Tabled
50-43). 178




SENATE AMENDMENTS TO MX AUTHORIZATIONS
I. 1980
(Glenn, D-OH) Prohibit Pentagon from spending money on MX basing until it
studied feasibility of "fully-mobile basing", a plan to deploy the missiles on truck trailers
using interstate highways (Rejected 9-80). 179
II. 1981 (Fiscal 1981 Defense Supplemental Authorization)
(Pressler, R-SD) Symbolic reduction of $7 million in research funds for MX basing
system (Tabled 79-15). 180
III. 1982
(Glenn, D-OH) Scrap MX missile and begin development of a new missile that
could more easily be protected against Soviet missile attacks (Tabled 65-29). 181
IV. 1983
A . (Hart, D-CO; Hatfield, R-OR) Delete MX procurement funds (Rejected 41-
58). 182
B . (Moynihan, D-NY) Bar deployment ofMX (Rejected 42-57). 183
179 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 62.
180 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 196.
181 1982 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 94.




A . (Chiles, D-FL) Bar funding of additional MX production in 1985 (Rejected
48-49, Bush vote required to break tie). 184
B . (Leahy, D-VT; Bumpers, D-AR) Kill the MX program outright by barring
any MX missiles beyond 21 authorized in FY84 (Rejected 41-55). 185
VI. 1985
(Nunn, D-GA) Express sense of Senate that after 50 MXs bought for deployment,
additional missiles would be bought only as spares, unless the president proposed and
Congress approved a different basing method; reduced FY86 MXs authorized to 12 and all
12 would be used as spares and test missiles (Reagan requested 48 and committee
recommended 21); expressed sense of Senate that 12 to 21 MXs should be funded in FY87
(Adopted 78-20). 186
VII. 1986
(Wilson, R-CA) Bar use of funds to begin work on Midgetman unless Pentagon
certified that the weapon would be cost effective and able to survive a Soviet attack;
deployment of more than 50 MXs would face the same prohibition (Tabled 64-30). 187
184 1984 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 48-9.
185Ibid.
186 1985 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 147.
187 1986 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 476.
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VIII. 1987
A . (Levin, D-MI) Transfer $500 million from Midgetman and $400 million
from rail-MX and pare out $900 million to Army (Nunn substitute accepted). 188
B . (Nunn, D-GA) Leave ICBM funding intact and declare that funding of both
programs in FY88 did not constitute a commitment by Congress to proceed to production
with either system (Adopted Voice). 189
IX. 1988
(Levin, D-MI; Simon, D-IL) Cut MX funds from $700 million to $200 million; use
$500 million saved to build up conventional combat-readiness (Tabled 61-36). 190
X. 1989
(Levin, D-MI) Would have duplicated reductions made by the House in the
authorization for the rail-mobile version of the MX missile (Tabled 61-39). 191
188 1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 248.
189Ibid.
190 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 422.
191 1989 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 458.
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APPENDIX Q
SENATE AMENDMENTS TO TRIDENT APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1983
(Levin, D-MI) Add $10 million to develop a maneuverable re-entry vehicle for the
Trident II submarine-launched missile; part of a $350.6 million package (Adopted
Voice). 192
192 1983 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 490.
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APPENDIX R
SENATE AMENDMENTS TO B-l APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1976
(Proxmire, D-WI) Recommended to delay until 1 February 1977 the production
decision on the B-l bomber and to bar expenditure of the B-l procurement money until
February. Adopted by a 15-14 committee vote and was not challenged on the floor (1976
Almanac, 771).
II. 1977
A . (Stennis, D-MS) Delete $1.4 billion previously authorized for procurement
of five B-ls. The committee report was ordered the day before Carter announced his B-l
decision, so the committee's bill contained the originally requested funds. On July 13, the
committee voted 10-5 to remove the funds from the bill (Adopted 59-36). 193
B . (Bellmon, R-OK) Delete more than $400 million in research funds for the
B-l, later reduced to delete $200 million (Rejected 27-7 1). 194
III. 1981
A . (Hollings, D-SC) Delete $2.4 billion from B-l and redistribute $1.8 billion
for conventional weapons and combat readiness improvements (Rejected 28-66). 195
B . (Nunn, D-GA) Require the president to certify to Congress a baseline cost
of the B-l program to measure future cost increases against (Adopted Voice). 196
193 1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 271-2.
194Ibid., 272.




SENATE AMENDMENTS TO MX APPROPRIATIONS
I. 1979
A . (Hatfield, R-OR) Delete $670 million for MX development, and replace it
with a $20 million appropriation to begin modifying existing Minuteman III missiles so
they could be carried by small submarines (Rejected 1 1-70). 197
B . (Stevens, R-AL) None of the bill funds could be used to commit MX to any
specific basing mode. Of the $670 million request, $230 million was earmarked for
development of the basing mode with only $55 million related to the racetrack version
(Adopted 89-0). 198
II. 1980
(Eagleton, D-MO) Cut $120 million from the $1.6 billion appropriated for MX
missile development (Rejected 12-65). 199
III. 1981
A . (Cohen, R-ME; Nunn, D-GA) Discourage the Reagan proposal to deploy
MX missiles in superhardened silos and make the administration concentrate its effort on a
permanent, more survivable basing method. Of $354 million earmarked for development
of the interim MX basing mode, $334 million could be used only for development of a
method putting missiles in "non-superhardened" existing silos (Adopted 90-4).200
197^979 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 255.
198Ibid., 256.
199 1980 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 195.
200 1981 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 322.
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B . (Pryor, D-AK) Delete the entire $354 million requested to develop an
interim MX basing method (Rejected 35-60). 201
C . (DeConcini, D-AZ) Express the sense of the Senate that the MX missile
should not be deployed in areas of high population density (Tabled 57-35).202
IV. 1982
(Hart, D-CO; Dec 16) Block the first flight test of the MX until Congress approved
a specific method for basing the missile. This was a late addendum to an administration-
backed provision the Senate adopted by a 56-42 vote that postponed a decision on MX
basing until mid- 1983 (Adopted Voice).203
V. 1983
A . (Bumpers, D-AK; Nov 7) Delete the $2.1 billion earmarked for the first 21
production-line versions of the missile (Rejected 37-56).204
B . (Kassebaum, R-KA) Express sense of the Senate that Reagan should
propose to Moscow a mutual moratorium on flight tests of ICBMs with multiple warheads
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